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Prior research has demonstrated that the relationship between defendant 
characteristics and prosecutorial decision-making is nuanced and often difficult to 
detect. A complete understanding of this relationship requires a holistic approach 
examining multiple decision points and a sound theoretical foundation. Using data 
from the New York County District Attorney’s Office, this study investigates 
disparities in case outcomes across several decision-making stages. Informed by a 
theoretical perspective that combines focal concerns and typescripts theories, I 
argue that during the course of their work, prosecutors develop impressions of 
archetypal offenders for individual offense types. Decisions made throughout case 
processing are subsequently influenced by the degree to which the defendant 
matches the description of the archetypal offender associated with the charged 
offense. Findings provide mixed support for the hypotheses put forth in the study. 
Results are discussed as they relate to theories of courtroom dynamics, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
There is a long history of researchers investigating the influence of 
extralegal factors in criminal justice decision-making. Defendant race and gender 
are some of the most salient factors, with these characteristics being shown to 
have varying effects across multiple decision points in the American criminal 
justice system. The race or gender of a suspected offender can affect decisions 
involving arrest (Black and Reiss, 1970; Kochel, Wilson, and Mastrofski, 2011), 
pretrial detention (Chiricos and Bales, 1991; Demuth, 2003; Spohn, 2009), formal 
charging (Spohn, Gruhl, and Welch, 1987; Henning and Feder, 2005), and 
sentencing (Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Ulmer, 1998; Johnson, 2003; Johnson 
and Betsinger, 2009). Further, interaction effects of these extralegal variables 
often reveal disparate outcomes even when their direct effects do not 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998). It is often necessary to analyze variables such as race 
and gender in conjunction with one another in order to reveal undue influence on 
case processing outcomes. In addition to the interaction of factors such as race 
and gender, the effects of these extralegal variables on case processing outcomes 
can also depend on case factors such as criminal history (Steffensmeier et al., 
1998) and crime type (Shermer and Johnson, 2010). Stereotypical notions of 
dangerousness and culpability are not distributed evenly across all members of a 
race or gender, and instead are more salient for certain subgroups that are defined 
by specific combinations of legal and extralegal characteristics. 
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Long considered the black box of the criminal justice system, the 
introduction of new sources of data related to prosecution has begun to allow 
researchers to shed light on the mechanisms influencing prosecutorial decision-
making. While the vast majority of research investigating decision-making within 
the court system has focused on sentencing (e.g. Steffensmeier et al., 1998; 
Johnson, 2003; Steen, Engen, and Gainey, 2005), studies investigating the role of 
race and gender have shown that prosecutorial decision-making is not immune to 
the influence of extralegal factors (Albonetti and Hepburn, 1996; Kutateladze et 
al., 2014). This is of concern given the prosecutor’s involvement and discretion in 
multiple case processing stages. Indeed, prosecutors are often involved in the 
initial decision to prosecute, the filing of criminal charges, charge reductions, and 
the plea-bargaining process (Shermer and Johnson, 2010). Scholars have provided 
evidence that the race of the defendant affects decisions made by prosecutors at 
various points in case processing (Kutateladze, 2018). Similarly, the gender of the 
defendant has been found to affect prosecutorial decision-making (Spohn, Gruhl, 
Welch, 1987; Shermer and Johnson, 2010). Evidence that the race of the victim 
affects decisions such as whether to seek the death penalty has also been provided 
by researchers (Paternoster, 1984; Paternoster and Brame, 2008). In contrast, 
other studies have found no direct effects of race on prosecutorial decision-
making and case processing outcomes (Bishop and Frazier, 1984; Albonetti, 
1992; Spears and Spohn, 1997; Shermer and Johnson, 2010).  
Given the complex nature of prosecutorial decision-making, it is necessary 
to examine how certain constellations of legal and extralegal characteristics might 
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differentially affect case outcomes (Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Wooldredge, 
2012). The literature on case processing suggests that defendant race and gender 
often exert influence on case outcomes independently, but such a singular focus 
fails to capture the entire picture. The effects of defendant race and gender are 
likely conditioned by certain key legal variables such as criminal history and 
defense counsel. Indeed, Kurlychek and Johnson (2019: 299) argue that “both 
prosecutors’ charging decisions and judicial sentencing decisions are explicitly 
tied to assessments of prior criminal history.” Criminal history is used by criminal 
justice actors such as the prosecutor to evaluate the blameworthiness of the 
defendant and his or her risk of reoffending (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). 
Additionally, the type of defense counsel is a key legal variable for two reasons. It 
is often used as a proxy for socioeconomic status (Kutateladze et al., 2014), 
because defendants represented by private attorneys tend to have greater 
socioeconomic resources. Additionally, the public defender and prosecutor are 
part of the same courtroom workgroup and develop close working relationships 
(Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Sudnow, 1965). These relationships likely result in 
greater routinization of case processing and plea bargain negotiations when 
compared to cases involving private defense attorneys, who do not have the same 
working relationships with prosecutors. 
The literature provides evidence that defendant race, gender, criminal 
history, and defense counsel are important variables that influence the manner in 
which a given criminal case is processed. In order to fully understand the 
influence of these variables, it is important to examine how they interact with one 
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another and how they interact with the offense the defendant is accused of 
committing. A common critique of the literature on prosecution is that studies 
have often focused on a single crime type (Kutateladze, 2018). It is important to 
examine how decision-making might vary across different offenses because the 
effects of race and gender could be conditioned by the offense charged. 
Theoretically, disadvantages for certain racial and gender groups may be more 
pronounced when the offense aligns with negative stereotypes associated with that 
group. In contrast, restricting analyses to a singular crime type has implications 
for external validity (Kutateladze et al., 2014); it hinders generalizability because 
charging practices likely vary across offense types. Furthermore, while race and 
ethnicity might not exert a direct influence on outcomes such as charge 
reductions, this might change when disaggregating by offense type (Shermer and 
Johnson, 2010). 
Importantly, because the prosecutor is involved in multiple stages of case 
processing, he or she is in a unique position of power over the outcome of 
criminal cases (Davis, 2007). Prosecutors enjoy wide discretion in multiple 
consequential case processing decisions (Forst, 2010; Pfaff, 2017; Kurlychek and 
Johnson, 2019). Discretion is an important component of the prosecutor’s role and 
is needed so that he or she can weigh factors unique to the case at hand and 
provide individualized justice. A complete lack of discretionary power when 
making case processing decisions would require prosecutors to treat each criminal 
case exactly the same. Such inflexibility would prevent prosecutors from taking 
into account factors such as strength of evidence, a victim’s attitude towards 
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prosecution, and the defendant’s prior record (Davis, 2007). However, broad 
discretion across multiple decision points also risks the introduction of bias into 
prosecutorial decision-making. 
Previous research that has analyzed multiple stages in case processing has 
provided evidence of decisions made in early stages affecting the outcomes at 
later stages, such as the final sentencing decision (Wooldredge, 2012; Sutton, 
2013; Kutateladze et al., 2014). In addition, prosecutorial discretion may be 
greater at certain stages, and thus be more vulnerable to the influence of biases, 
compared to others. Therefore, the prosecutor’s involvement at each of these 
decision points is important to consider when examining the effects of extralegal 
factors on case processing outcomes. When reviewing the extant literature, it is 
made clear that researchers need to examine constellations of legal and extralegal 
variables across multiple decision points. Accordingly, proper empirical 
investigation of prosecutorial decision-making requires both a theoretical and 
methodological framework that allows researchers to consider how decisions 
might be influenced by varying combinations of legal and extralegal factors 
across different decision points. 
Prosecutorial decision-making is a complex subject that presents a host of 
empirical issues for researchers. Currently, the extant research has not adequately 
examined the interplay of key legal and extralegal factors, and how they may 
combine to impact the decision-making of prosecutors across multiple stages in 
case processing. This study aims to provide new insights into the complex nature 
of prosecutorial decision-making by examining how defendant race and gender, 
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combined with criminal history and type of legal defense, interact with offense 
type to affect case processing outcomes at multiple decision points. Using a 
framework that incorporates political science research on the courtroom 
workgroup with focal concerns and typescripts theories, the current study 
examined case processing outcomes across multiple crime types in order to test 
whether prosecutors construct stereotypical descriptions of typical offenders in 
ways that shape important charging outcomes, including case dismissal, plea 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 The prosecutor is in a unique place in both the criminal justice system and 
the field of criminology. Within the criminal justice system, the prosecutor is 
granted discretion and control over multiple decision points in case processing, 
which culminates in a level of power not experienced by other actors (Worrall, 
2008). Within the field of criminology, the prosecutor remains relatively 
understudied when compared to other criminal justice actors such as police or 
judges. This combination of wide discretion and lack of empirical analysis leaves 
prosecution vulnerable to patterns of inequity in decision-making that go 
unnoticed and unchecked. This chapter aims to highlight the need for more 
research on prosecutorial decision-making by explaining both the role of the 
prosecutor within the criminal justice system, and the state of empirical research 
on prosecution. The first subsection is comprised of literature largely from legal 
scholars outlining the role and function of the prosecutor, while the second 
subsection reviews the social scientific literature on this courtroom actor. 
An Overview of the American Prosecutor 
 
Unlike most other components of the American criminal justice system, 
the role of the prosecutor was not imported from European systems such as 
English common law (Walker, 1998). Instead, the American prosecutor largely 
evolved independent of influence from other systems (Jacoby, 1980). Over the 
course of American history, the prosecutor transitioned from a largely 
inconsequential office to a highly influential political figure. This transition 
occurred gradually as the criminal justice system was continually reformed. 
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Successive movements targeting various aspects of the system resulted in public 
prosecutions, the democratization of the prosecutor through elections and 
establishment of local offices, and the prosecutor’s shift from judicial to executive 
branch of government (Jacoby, 1980). In the course of American history, criminal 
justice reforms have rarely targeted prosecutors specifically (Pfaff, 2017), but 
they have nonetheless impacted the prosecutor’s role within the system (Worrall, 
2008). It is important to understand how prosecutors came to occupy such an 
influential position in order to gain insight into the extent of their centrality to the 
current criminal justice system. 
While prosecutors have existed since the founding of the United States, 
their role within the criminal justice system has evolved over time. During both 
colonial and post-revolution America, prosecutions were primarily private affairs. 
Public prosecutors existed, but it was much more common for individual citizens 
to file charges against their fellow citizens with the help of a private attorney 
(Walker, 1998; Pfaff, 2017). However, as the country grew during the 19th 
century, so too did the need for a more bureaucratic and modern criminal justice 
system. A push for the democratization of the criminal justice system gained 
significant momentum and major reforms were passed during the Jackson 
administration (Worrall, 2008; Pfaff, 2017). Laws targeting corruption were 
passed to require public election rather than appointment of prosecutors, and over 
time private prosecutions were eliminated (Davis, 2007; Pfaff, 2017). 
The reforms that intended to create a more modern and professional 
criminal justice system steadily increased the power and centrality of the 
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prosecutor, a pattern that would continue through to the 21st century (Walker, 
1998; Worrall, 2008). The function of the public prosecutor fundamentally 
changed, and the office became an important public official with considerable 
political power. Further increasing the prosecutor’s role in criminal case 
processing were multiple landmark Supreme Court cases that granted additional 
rights to criminal defendants. Decisions in cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright 
(1963) and Miranda v. Arizona (1966) extended a defendant’s right to counsel, 
requiring the presence of an attorney during criminal trials and police 
interrogations (Worrall, 2008). The required presence of counsel compelled 
prosecutors to attend proceedings and deal with defense attorneys at stages where 
they previously would not have been present (Worrall, 2008). 
The American prosecutor today assumes a central role in deciding how a 
criminal case is pursued, but this has not always been true. Instead, the 
prosecutor’s role within the criminal justice system has become increasingly 
centralized through years of reform (Worrall, 2008). Furthermore, prosecutors’ 
current position of power extends far past control over criminal cases. As Jacoby 
(1980, p. 7) stated “The prosecutor’s influence spans both the executive and the 
judicial branches of government. His authority is locally derived, yet his power 
affects the state and the national levels.” Prosecutors are in a unique position of 
occupational and political power that allows them to not only hold sway over the 
flow of criminal cases and execution of the law, but also influence the politicians 
who pass and change criminal laws. 
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The effects of these reforms culminated in the creation of the modern 
American prosecutor. Today American prosecutors are unique compared to both 
their domestic and international colleagues in the criminal justice system 
(Worrall, 2008). Perhaps the greatest distinction between prosecutors in America 
and those abroad is their status as elected officials, something that only exists in 
the American system (Ellis, 2011). Prosecutors are elected in forty-six states, with 
Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, and New Jersey being the four that require the 
appointment of prosecutors (Pfaff, 2017).1 Although in most jurisdictions local 
district attorneys are elected to their position, the assistant attorneys that work in 
the office and often prosecute cases are not (Worrall, 2008). This convoluted 
system of elections and appointments has made it difficult for legislators to pass 
large scale structural reforms. Additionally, a lack of centralized organization of 
prosecution in America inhibits the systematic collection of data on case 
processing and prosecutorial decision-making. The absence of a national system 
of state prosecutors, or even standardized structure of prosecution, effectively 
insulates prosecutors from large scale reform efforts and empirical scrutiny. 
The Prosecutor’s Place within the Courtroom Workgroup 
 
 Prosecutors typically receive criminal cases from police and must evaluate 
the evidence provided to them in order determine whether prosecuting the case is 
a worthwhile endeavor. If prosecutors decide that the evidence against a 
defendant is sufficient to warrant prosecution, they must also decide which 
criminal charges to formally file. The decision to drop the charges outright or to 
 
1 At the national level, federal prosecutors (U.S. Attorneys and the Attorney General), are placed 
in their positions via presidential appointment. 
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proceed with prosecution is primarily driven by the strength of evidence against 
the defendant, but it can also be influenced by external factors, both legal and 
extralegal (Forst, 2011; Frederick and Stemen, 2012). This is true throughout the 
entirety of case-processing. While legal factors such as evidence and criminal 
history primarily determine the trajectory of a criminal case, extralegal factors 
such as defendant race and courtroom norms exert influence on how a criminal 
case is processed (Frederick and Stemen, 2012; Forst, 2011). Gaining a deeper 
insight into the external factors that influence prosecutorial decision-making is 
necessary to better understand the role and power of the prosecutor in the 
American criminal justice system. 
 The prosecutor operates within a group of courtroom actors that develop 
relationships and norms that dictate how criminal cases are processed (Eisenstein 
et al. 1988). It is often a key goal of the entire courtroom workgroup to avoid 
having a criminal case advance to trial. Instead, efficiently disposing of cases in a 
timely manner is seen as necessary to maintain a steady workload (Steen et al., 
2005). Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges alike view the criminal trial as a 
lengthy and burdensome process that interferes with the efficient processing of 
criminal cases. It is perceived as being in the best interest of the courtroom to 
drop weaker cases outright and seek a guilty plea for cases deemed worthy of 
prosecution. Of course, there are occasional exceptions to this rule, and 
prosecutors have been found to accept weak cases due to pressure from other 
criminal justice actors (Frederick & Stemen, 2012). For most cases, however, the 
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avoidance of trial is preferable for the prosecutor, public defender, and judge and 
tactics are developed within the courtroom to achieve this goal.  
Pretrial Responsibilities of the Prosecutor 
 
Charging is arguably the stage in case processing where the prosecutor 
exerts the most influence on the outcome of a criminal case. This is due to 
unilateral control, lack of judicial oversight, and the effect that original charges 
have on the trajectory of the case. McCoy (2005) argues that in a system where 
judicial discretion is minimized by mandatory sentences and plea deals are 
encouraged, the sentence is virtually decided by the prosecutor’s charging 
decision. While not the only method of charge origination, most criminal charges 
in the U.S. are initiated by the police via arrest, summons, or desk appearance 
ticket (Kutateladze, 2018). It is after this point that the prosecutor first assumes a 
role in the processing of a criminal case. During this stage, often referred to as 
case screening, the prosecutor is tasked with deciding whether to formally file 
charges against an individual or drop the case (Davis, 2007; Kutateladze, 2018). 
The prosecutor may follow the charge or charges originally assigned by the police 
or alter their categorization of the incident. There is no law that requires a 
prosecutor to charge an individual who has been arrested, nor is there a law or 
rigid system that dictates which charges a prosecutor should file (Davis, 2007). 
Case screening is when a case officially enters the criminal justice system 
and charges are initially filed. Research shows that early decision-points such as 
charging can have large impacts on the disposition and sentencing of criminal 
cases (Shermer and Johnson, 2010; Wooldredge, 2012; Kutateladze et al., 2014). 
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As is the case with much of the decision points under the prosecutor’s control, 
case screening is not uniform. Case screening procedure, as well as offense 
classifications, vary across jurisdictions. For example, Forst (2011) argues that 
prosecutor offices can either focus on achieving quality convictions through a 
more selective screening stage, or simply more convictions through a less 
selective screening process. Because there is no constitutional standard for 
prosecutorial rules and standards, which tactic an individual office decides to take 
is at their discretion (Forst, 2011).  
In misdemeanor cases, as well as with felonies in courts that do not use a 
grand jury system, the filing of charges is left entirely up to the prosecutor’s 
discretion (Davis, 2007). In most jurisdictions, a grand jury is used in order to file 
charges for felony cases. In a grand jury hearing, the prosecutor must convince a 
jury that there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed in order 
for an indictment to be filed. While the purpose of the grand jury is to provide a 
democratic check against unjust arrests, in reality it is rare that the grand jury does 
not find probable cause. Prosecutors are given the keys to the grand jury hearing 
and are typically able to steer it in the direction they want. The prosecutor decides 
which evidence to present, as well as which witnesses will be called. In both cases 
that require a grand jury and those that do not, the prosecutor is firmly in control. 
Highlighting the unilateral control that prosecutors have during case 
screening is not to suggest that they mindlessly decide which charges to file for 
each case. In fact, despite a lack of explicit rules governing prosecutorial 
decision-making during case screening, previous research has shown that 
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decisions made by prosecutors during this phase are largely driven by the strength 
of evidence and seriousness of the offense (Forst, 2011; Frederick and Stemen, 
2012). However, the lack of constraints on prosecutorial decision-making at this 
stage leave room for other factors, both legal and extralegal, to affect charging 
outcomes (Albonetti, 1992; Ulmer, Kurlychek, and Kramer, 2003; Shermer and 
Johnson, 2010; Kutateladze, 2018). In addition, decisions and policies made by 
prosecutors have downstream effects. For example, the decision to focus on either 
quality convictions or a greater number of convictions has implications for plea 
bargaining rates (Forst, 2011). Forst (2011) argues that offices with a focus on 
quantity of convictions and a less-selective screening process tend to have greater 
plea-to-trial ratios. This downstream effect highlights the cause for concern 
regarding extralegal influence on plea bargaining, which can occur at any time 
between filing and conviction (Davis, 2007).  
Plea Bargaining 
 
Plea bargaining can be defined as the process during which a defendant 
decides to forgo his or her constitutional right to trial and plead guilty in exchange 
for an implicit or explicit benefit, usually in the form of reduced charges or a 
favorable sentencing recommendation (Davis, 2007). Previously reserved for low-
level crimes with a low likelihood of custodial sentences, plea bargaining has 
become ubiquitous in the American criminal justice system and the primary 
disposition of criminal cases (McCoy, 2005). The increase in pleas as a share of 
criminal case dispositions over the past few decades coincides with sentencing 
reforms and an increase in prosecutorial power (McCoy, 2005; Johnson, King, 
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and Spohn, 2016; Johnson, 2019). While plea bargaining can increase efficient 
processing of cases and appear to benefit all parties involved (Johnson, 2019), it is 
still a question whether the system is able to consistently provide just outcomes 
for defendants when it so heavily relies on the forfeiture of a defendant’s right to 
trial in order to function.  
Plea bargaining is an informal process involving negotiations between the 
prosecution and the defense that occurs outside of the courtroom. Unlike case 
screening, plea bargaining is not a single stage in case-processing but can occur at 
any time between case screening and final disposition, even after a trial has 
commenced (Davis, 2007). In practice, however, most pleas are offered at the 
arraignment stage, where defendants are notified of the formal charges that have 
been filed against them (Kutateladze, 2018). Similar to case screening, this 
process is not subject to any institutionalized protocols, besides those mandated 
by the chief prosecutor (Frederick and Stemen, 2012). Although plea bargaining 
is conducted on an individual basis, “going rates” for what discounts are 
acceptable for a given offense are established over time through repeated 
negotiations (Sudnow, 1965; McCoy, 2005). Such rates can be reinforced through 
the office policies and philosophy established by the head prosecutor. These 
office policies exert a significant amount of influence on how prosecutors 
negotiate with defense attorneys and what deals are perceived as acceptable 
(Forst, 2011). They also influence the trajectory of cases and a prosecutor office’s 
plea-to-trial ratio. This ratio will be affected by whether the office prioritizes 
quality or quantity of convictions. Offices prioritizing quantity will encourage 
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striking plea deals, while offices that stress quality convictions will likely see 
more cases go to trial (Forst, 2011). More selective case screening frees up more 
resources that can then be used to bring cases to trial (Worral, 2008). 
An increase in plea bargains, and decrease in trials, reduces financial costs 
for all parties involved (Johnson et al., 2016). Many criticisms of the criminal 
justice system often cite the heavy workloads of defense attorneys, but 
prosecutors are often weighed down by large caseloads as well (Kohler-
Hausmann, 2018). Judges are able to avoid time-intensive adjudication processes 
and avoid backlogs on court dockets when more cases are pled out (Eisenstein, 
Flemming, and Nardulli, 1988). Defendants benefit by receiving a certain, and 
oftentimes more lenient, sentence (Johnson, 2019). Pleading guilty can also prove 
financially beneficial for defendants. In misdemeanor cases, the financial costs of 
fighting the charges brought against an individual often outweigh the cost of plea 
deals offered early on in case processing (Feeley, 1979; Kohler-Hausmann, 2018). 
As a result, all actors are effectively incentivized to encourage plea deals, even 
though this might not be in the best interest of the defendant (McCoy, 2005). This 
incentivization in turn creates an advantage for prosecutors. In a system that 
encourages the proliferation of guilty pleas, the prosecutor starts negotiations 
from a position of great strength. This position of strength is even more solidified 
when considering the trial tax, or increased punishment experienced by 
defendants convicted at trial compared to those who pled guilty to the same crime.  
The notion that defendants convicted at trial are subject to harsher 
penalties is well-established (Johnson, 2019). This phenomenon has been shown 
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to affect decisions made by defendants. When a defendant perceives the 
likelihood of conviction to be high and the projected sentence to be long, the 
defendant will be more likely to plead guilty (Kramer, Wolbransky, and Heilbrun, 
2007). Sentencing reforms such as mandatory minimums and presumptive 
guidelines have effectively provided prosecutors with bargaining chips with 
which to threaten defendants (Pfaff, 2017). As McCoy stated, “the ‘going rate’ 
has become so inflated for sentences after trial conviction that defendants are, in 
effect, coerced into guilty pleas” (2005: p. 87).  
The prevalence of plea bargaining in the American criminal justice system 
translates to a system of punishment fundamentally shaped by plea outcomes. The 
American criminal justice system is the most expansive in the world, processing 
and incarcerating more individuals than any other country (Pfaff, 2017). In 
today’s system, plea bargains are needed in order to maintain the flow of criminal 
cases. Despite the system’s heavy reliance on plea bargains, the operation and 
effects of plea bargaining are still yet to be fully understood. This lack of 
knowledge is due in part to a lack of external oversight and limited data collection 
on prosecutors. 
The State of Prosecutorial Oversight 
 
For all of the discretion that prosecutors have over various points in case 
processing, their actions are typically not subject to independent oversight.  While 
formalized policies have been developed to safeguard against police and judicial 
misconduct, prosecutors have largely avoided such reforms (Forst, 2011). For 
example, an attempt to create an independent commission on prosecutorial 
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conduct in New York State which would have had the power to investigate claims 
of misconduct and issue penalties to prosecutors whom the commission felt had 
acted inappropriately or illegally was recently struck down by a state supreme 
court justice, who ruled it violated the State’s Constitution (Soares v State of New 
York, 2019). In place of such reforms, prosecutorial oversight is instead left to the 
prosecutors themselves (Davis, 2007). 
The lack of external prosecutorial oversight is an issue for researchers and 
policy makers alike, as it insulates prosecutors from empirical examination and 
independent investigation of possible cases of misconduct. Without independent 
evaluation, it is difficult for prosecutors and researchers to determine if criminal 
cases are being processed equitably. As Davis (2007) argues, “when there is no 
effective system of public accountability, it is difficult to engage in honest and 
meaningful self-critique.” For academics, the absence of quality prosecution data 
allows for the continued existence of large gaps in the criminological literature. 
Independent analyses of the practices and procedure of this key actor are needed 
to fully understand issues such as mass incarceration and disparate sentencing 
outcomes. While legal research helps to illustrate the role of the prosecutor within 
the American criminal justice system, social science research is needed to better 
understand the function and consequences of the prosecutor’s decision-making. 
The next section provides a review of the extant social science literature on 
prosecution and prosecutorial decision-making. 
Empirical Research on Prosecution 
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While the bulk of research on the influence of race and gender on 
punishment has focused on the final sentencing decision (Miethe and Moore, 
1985; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998; Johnson, 2003; Steen et al., 
2005), researchers have provided informative analyses on prosecution reaching 
back decades (Albonetti, 1987; Albonetti, 1992; Spears and Spohn, 1997; 
Beichner and Spohn, 2005). Although these studies added important insights to 
the literature, access to prosecutorial data has been notoriously difficult to obtain 
(Shermer and Johnson, 2010), and early studies are the exceptions that prove the 
rule. Moreover, the scope of early studies was often limited due to the scarcity of 
prosecutorial data. However, in recent years the bulwark preventing empirical 
analysis of prosecution has been weakened by public pressure and progressive-
minded prosecutors. There has been an increase in research on the prosecutor as 
new, richer sources of data have become available and the power possessed by the 
prosecutor over criminal cases has been increasingly recognized (Johnson, King, 
and Spohn, 2016). Informative studies have shown that while legal factors tend to 
have the greatest impact on decision-making, prosecutors are nonetheless 
susceptible to the undue influence of extralegal factors when making charging 
decisions (Shermer & Johnson, 2010; Sommers et al., 2014; Kutateladze et al., 
2014; Kutateladze, 2018). The prosecutor has been found to be influenced by the 
race and gender of the defendant (Shermer and Johnson, 2010; Kutateladze, 2018) 
as well as the victim (Spohn et al., 2001). The degree to which prosecutors are 
influenced by the defendant race and gender on prosecutorial decision-making is 
not always uniform across crime type. Instead, the magnitude of their influence 
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can depend on the offense the defendant is charged with (Shermer and Johnson, 
2010). Additionally, a growing literature on prosecutorial decision-making 
stresses the importance of evaluating prosecutorial decision-making at multiple 
stages of case processing (Shermer and Johnson 2010; Frederick and Stemen, 
2012; Ulmer, 2012; Sutton, 2013; Kutateladze et al., 2016; Kutateladze, 2018). 
Extralegal Influence on Prosecutorial Decision-Making 
 
Early work investigating the role of extralegal influence on prosecutorial 
decision-making tended to focus on a single point in case processing or a single 
crime type, and the results of different studies often contradicted one another. For 
example, in a study of 300 homicides cases eligible for the death penalty, 
Paternoster (1984) found that the race of the victim significantly influenced the 
prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty. In addition, the death penalty was 
most likely to be sought in cases involving black defendants accused of killing 
white victims, compared to other racial dyads (Paternoster, 1984). In a later study, 
Albonetti (1987) analyzed 6,014 felony cases screened by the U.S. Attorney’s 
office in Washington DC and failed to find evidence of extralegal influence on 
prosecutorial decision-making at this stage. Albonetti (1987) found that the 
decision to prosecute was primarily driven by legally relevant characteristics such 
as the presence of exculpatory evidence and the use of a weapon. Race and gender 
did not have statistically significant effects on the probability of prosecution 
(Albonetti, 1987). In the same year, Spohn and colleagues (1987) conducted a 
study using a sample of 33,000 cases in Los Angeles in which the defendant was 
charged with a single crime. Like Albonetti, Spohn and colleagues (1987) 
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investigated the role of defendant race and gender on the prosecutor’s decision to 
accept or dismiss the criminal charge. Unlike in Albonetti’s study, females were 
more likely to have the charge against them rejected compared to males, and this 
pattern held for White, Black, and Hispanic defendants (Spohn et al., 1987). 
Further, Hispanic and Black males were most likely to be fully prosecuted, 
compared to white males and all female ethnic groups (Spohn et al., 1987). In a 
later analysis of case screening, Albonetti (1992) examined 404 cases involving 
burglary and robbery charges processed in Jacksonville, Fl between 1979 and 
1980. Race and gender of the defendant were not found to significantly affect the 
decision to reduce charges at the screening stage. She found, however, that 
younger defendants were less likely to have their charges reduced than older ones 
(1992). 
As researchers continued to probe the effects of extralegal characteristics 
on prosecutorial decision-making, analyses continued to return mixed results, 
with some providing evidence for the undue influence of variables such as 
defendant race and gender, while others did not. Albonetti and Hepburn (1996) 
conducted a study of pre-filed deferred prosecution program started by the 
Maricopa County, Arizona Attorney’s Office. Within this program, felony drug 
cases could be deferred to treatment programs rather than full prosecution at case 
screening. The researchers found that female, as well as younger defendants, were 
more likely to be diverted from prosecution and into treatment programs when 
compared to male and older defendants (Albonetti and Hepburn, 1996). They did 
not find that minority status of the defendant, defined as being African American 
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or Hispanic, directly affected the decision to defer a case to drug treatment. 
However, Albonetti and Hepburn (1996) did find evidence of an interaction effect 
between having a prior record and being African American or Hispanic, 
suggesting that understanding how prosecutorial biases manifest themselves 
requires complex modeling. In contrast, a study of sexual assault cases prosecuted 
in Detroit, Michigan, conducted by Spears and Spohn (1997) found that no 
extralegal characteristics of the defendant affected charging decisions. Instead, 
victim characteristics were found to be the only significant predictors of whether 
charges were brought in a case (Spears and Spohn, 1997). 
More recently, researchers reported a lack of support for extralegal 
influence on prosecutorial decision-making after examining 526 cases that were 
initially assigned a forceable rape charge by police in Kansas City and 
Philadelphia. Holleran and colleagues (2010) found that neither the race of the 
suspect nor the victim had a significant effect on the prosecutor’s decision-
making at screening. However, evidence for racial disparities in plea-bargaining 
outcomes was found in a study of misdemeanor marijuana cases prosecuted in 
Manhattan, New York (Kutateladze et al., 2016). The researchers found that 
Black and Latino defendants were less likely to receive plea deals that included a 
charge reduction and were more likely to receive a custodial plea when compared 
to White defendants (Kutateladze et al., 2016). Interestingly, Asian defendants 
received more favorable plea outcomes compared to all racial groups, including 
Whites (Kutateladze et al., 2016). 
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Results from extant literature on prosecution demonstrate that the role of 
extralegal characteristics in prosecutorial decision-making is far from completely 
understood. There has been a great deal of contradictory results in this area of 
research. It is likely that a portion of these contradictions can be blamed on 
limited data and scope. For example, a weakness in many studies on prosecutorial 
decision-making is the focus on a single crime type. Research only examining a 
single crime type may fail to identify how the influence of certain extralegal 
variables such as defendant race or gender may be conditioned by the type of 
offense. Furthermore, many early studies focused on unique offenses such as 
sexual assault (Spears and Spohn, 1997; Spohn et al., 2001; Beichner and Spohn, 
2005) or cases eligible for the death penalty (Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth, 
1983; Paternoster, 1984; Sorensen and Wallace, 1999; Paternoster and Brame, 
2008). Unique offense types such as these are likely handled differently by 
prosecutors compared to other crime types.  
It is also important to investigate prosecutorial decision-making at more 
than one decision point, as outcomes at certain stages in punishment do not occur 
in a vacuum. Focusing on a singular decision point, such as case screening, 
largely ignores the connections between different stages in case processing. 
Evidence suggests that decisions made by early-stage criminal justice actors can 
affect decisions made by actors involved in subsequent decision-making stages 
(Sutton, 2013; Kutateladze and Lawson, 2016). Given the interconnected nature 
of case processing decisions, a study of one decision point runs the risk of failing 
to identify extralegal influence at other points. Accounting for this is especially 
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important in research on prosecutorial decision-making because the prosecutor is 
in a unique position to directly affect multiple stages of case processing. The 
literature examining multiple case processing stages provides further insight into 
the dynamic nature of prosecutorial decision-making. 
The Examination of Prosecutorial Decision-Making Across Multiple Case 
Processing Stages 
 
Given that prosecutors are involved in multiple stages, is important to 
study how their decision-making may vary across these stages. While much of the 
early research was focused on one decision point, more recent work has been able 
to probe prosecutorial decision-making across multiple stages. However, much 
like the research that examined single decision points, the results of studies 
examining multiple stages are mixed (Kingsnorth, MacIntosh, and Wentworth, 
1999; Wooldredge and Thistlewaite, 2004; Shermer and Johnson, 2010; Sommers 
et al., 2014). For example, in a study of 365 adult sexual assault cases, 
Kingsnorth, MacIntosh, and Wentworth (1999) failed to find evidence that the 
race of the defendant and victim, in any combination, had a significant effect on 
any decision point throughout case processing. 
Further complicating the results of studies investigating racial disparities 
in prosecution, Wooldredge and Thistlewaite (2004) unexpectedly found that 
African American defendants experienced consistent benefits in case-processing 
when examining the cases of 2,948 male defendants arrested for misdemeanor 
assault against an intimate within Cincinnati, Ohio. The researchers found that 
Black defendants were less likely to be charged, more likely to have their cases 
dropped, and received shorter sentences when compared to white defendants 
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(Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004). However, the authors expressed caution 
in interpreting the results, suggesting that the benefits experienced by African 
American defendants could be an indication of a higher likelihood of arrest due to 
racialized police practices, which result in weaker cases brought against them. 
Evidence in support of racial and gender disparities in various case processing 
decisions was found in a study of 4,178 domestic violence cases prosecuted in 
Shelby County, Tennessee (Henning and Feder, 2005). While legal variables were 
consistently the most influential in courtroom decisions, female defendants were 
less likely to be held in pretrial detention or prosecuted, were less likely to plead 
or be found guilty, and were less likely to be incarcerated, compared to males 
(Henning and Feder, 2005). In regard to racial disparities, prosecutors were more 
likely to file charges at case screening for nonwhite defendants (Henning and 
Feder, 2005). 
The inconsistent results of studies on race, gender, and prosecution, even 
when examining more than one decision point, suggest a nuanced relationship. 
The relationship between these extralegal characteristics appear to be to subject to 
contextual influences such as crime type and may not always be direct. Indeed, in 
an analysis of 45,678 federal sentencing events, Shermer and Johnson (2010) 
found that gender had a direct effect on the likelihood of charge reductions, while 
other extralegal characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and age did not. However, 
race did have a significant effect in regard to weapons charges, with Black and 
Hispanic defendants being .70 times as likely to have their charges reduced 
compared to White defendants. In addition, gender disparities in charge 
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reductions were most pronounced for drug and violent offenses, further 
highlighting the importance to analyze prosecutorial data across various crime 
types (Shermer and Johnson, 2010). 
Shermer and Johnson’s study (2010) highlights the importance of 
investigating the interaction of certain variables and their relationship with 
prosecutorial decision-making. There is a clear need for analyses that investigate 
multiple constellations of legal and extralegal characteristics in addition to 
looking at multiple outcomes. In addition, it is important to investigate how these 
different stages affect one another. While examining outcomes multiple outcomes 
in prosecution adds to the strength of an analysis, looking at each stage in 
isolation still presents limitations. Research investigating the potential of 
disadvantages in case processing to accumulate provides even stronger evidence 
for the extralegal influence in prosecutorial decision-making. 
Cumulative Disadvantage 
 
Evidence of extralegal influence on prosecutorial decision-making is made 
even more concerning when considering the long-term potential of small 
inequities to snowball as a case is moved from screening to disposition. The 
control over multiple case-processing stages helps to orient the prosecutor to think 
downstream. A current decision made by a prosecutor will be influenced by their 
perception of how it will affect decision-making outcomes at later stages. This 
control over multiple decision points in case-processing creates the potential for 
prosecutorial decision-making to uniquely influence the trajectory and outcome of 
a criminal case. The potential of disadvantages caused by certain elements of 
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prosecutorial decision-making to accumulate and result in unjust outcomes 
necessitates rigorous academic investigation. 
 Cumulative disadvantage is described by Sutton (2013: 1208) as a 
“dynamic process in which an unfavorable initial social position leads to further 
losses in the future.” This concept is particularly salient within prosecutorial 
decision-making, due to the wide discretion enjoyed by prosecutors at multiple 
stages of case processing. Decisions made by the prosecutor during initial phases 
of case processing that result in disadvantage for the defendant can accelerate and 
compound to produce increased disadvantage at later stages. From initiation to 
disposition, disparities in processing outcomes have the potential to widen as 
cases are moved through the system. Wooldredge (2012) analyzed the case 
trajectories of 5,905 African American and White defendants arrested in Ohio 
during 2005. He found that African American males aged 18-29 were less likely 
to be released on their own recognizance and were assigned greater bond amounts 
when compared to all other defendants. These disparities in bail decisions found 
at early stages in case processing contributed to harsher sentencing outcomes, 
highlighting the downstream effects of early disadvantages in case processing 
(Wooldredge, 2012).  
Additional support for cumulative disadvantage was provided by Sutton 
(2013) in a study of a country-wide sample of male defendants from the year 
2000. Sutton (2013) analyzed the role of racial disadvantage in pretrial detention, 
guilty pleas, sentence severity, as well as cumulative effects across these three 
stages. Direct effects of race on outcomes in earlier stages of punishment were 
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found to disadvantage Black and Latino defendants and continue to affect later 
stages. Racial disparities were most pronounced in the decision to detain before 
trial, which subsequently exerted a strong influence on decisions related to plea 
bargains and sentencing (Sutton, 2013). Moreover, in a study examining case 
outcomes across multiple decision points and crime types, Kutateladze and 
colleagues (2014) found that Black and Latino defendants were treated more 
punitively for all case outcomes examined except for dismissal when compared to 
White defendants. Additionally, Black and Latino defendants were both more 
likely to receive the most disadvantaged combinations of decision-making 
outcomes when compared to whites. The disadvantages felt by these defendants 
were stronger in cases involving violent crimes, where it was hypothesized that 
racial stereotypes would be more likely to exert influence. Interestingly, the 
disadvantages felt by Black and Latino defendants were not extended to Asian 
defendants, who often received less punitive outcomes than White defendants 
(Kutateladze et al., 2014). The results of the study by Kutateladze and colleagues 
(2014) bolsters the argument that racial and ethnic stereotypes may exert a 
stronger influence for certain crime types. The results showed that while racial 
and ethnic disparities disadvantaged Black and Latino defendants overall, the 
extent of the disadvantage varied across offense type, as well as felony and 
misdemeanor classifications (Kutateladze et al., 2014). 
Research on prosecutorial decision-making and cumulative disadvantage 
not only highlights the importance of examining multiple decision points, but also 
the importance of examining prosecutorial decision-making across various 
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offense types (Shermer and Johnson, 2010; Kutateladze et al., 2014). Many of the 
studies on prosecution that failed to return evidence of extralegal influence on 
prosecutorial decision-making focused on one stage in case processing, such as 
case screening (Bernstein et al., 1977; Albonetti, 1987; Albonetti, 1992; Spears 
and Spohn, 1997; Holleran et al., 2010). In contrast, more consistent evidence of 
extralegal influence has been found by studies examining multiple stages of case 
processing, accounting for the interconnected nature of these decision points 
(Kutateladze et al., 2014; Henning and Feder, 2005; Kutateladze, 2018; Sutton, 
2013), though some studies examining multiple decision points have found little 
to no evidence of such influence (Kingsnorth et al., 1998; Wooldredge and 
Thistlewaite, 2004). Additionally, research examining prosecutorial decision-
making across different crime types has shown that disparities can vary in 
magnitude depending on the type of offense the defendant is charged with 
(Shermer and Johnson, 2010, Kutateladze et al., 2014). The logical next step 
would be to analyze offense specific differences in prosecutorial decision-making 
across multiple case processing decision points. However, due to reasons such as 
data limitations, this remains a gap in the literature that has not been sufficiently 
filled. Little research has examined how extralegal factors might affect 
prosecutorial decision-making across both different offense types and multiple 
stages in case processing. 
This study aims to address this deficiency in the current literature on 
prosecution by investigating the role of race and gender on decisions made 
throughout case processing. Prosecution is a complicated web of decision points 
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and factors, both legal and extralegal. In order to gain a complete understanding 
of how prosecution functions, social scientists need to take a wholistic approach 
to studying it that takes into account the variation in outcomes across both stage 
and offense. The following chapter will elaborate on how this study intends to do 
so by theorizing the function of prosecution and presenting the hypotheses to be 
tested. 
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Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses 
 
 Recent insights into the function of prosecutorial decision-making have 
been achieved through the incorporation of concepts developed within and outside 
the field of criminology. The success of such research highlights the importance 
of integrating various social scientific perspectives within criminology. This study 
aims to add to the current knowledge of prosecutorial decision-making by further 
integrating criminological theories with concepts developed within the fields of 
political science and social psychology. The following chapter introduces the 
relevant theoretical perspectives that serve as a guiding framework for this study’s 
research questions and hypotheses. 
Courtroom Dynamics 
Theoretically, the American criminal justice system is an adversarial 
system in which justice is mete out by dueling parties whose interests are distinct 
from one another. The prosecutor, arguing on behalf of the state, wants to obtain a 
conviction. The defense attorney, representing the defendant, ultimately wants to 
win the freedom of his or her client. In cases where the defendant is convicted, the 
defense attorney wants to obtain a lenient sentence. The judge aims to impartially 
preside over the criminal case, ensuring neither the prosecution nor defense 
overstep any boundaries along the way. In the case of a conviction, the judge is 
tasked with handing down a sentence that is commensurate with the crime and the 
perceived dangerousness of the defendant. These distinct goals are enveloped by 
the overarching mission of punishing those who have harmed society, but not 
allowing the state to abuse its power. In this idealized version of our criminal 
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justice system, every defendant receives individualized justice in which the details 
of their case are thoroughly examined, and the result is not influenced by external 
factors. 
 While the above goals are certainly in the minds of each courtroom actor 
during a criminal case, the function of the American criminal justice system is 
much different in practice. Rather than adversaries ardently fighting for one’s 
distinct goals, these actors instead operate as key members of the courtroom 
workgroup (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977). The courtroom workgroup operates like 
an organization in which “persons within the courtroom perform quite specialized 
functions, and their activity fits into a broader pattern and is constrained by it” 
(Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977: 10). The actors within this workgroup have different 
formal roles but rely on one another to accomplish shared goals. What these goals 
are can vary from workgroup to workgroup, but there is great continuity in terms 
of the goals which are deemed most important. Expeditious disposal of cases and 
reduction of uncertainty are often viewed as the most important goals of the 
courtroom workgroup, which both run contrary to the ideals of an adversarial 
system (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977). Indeed, instead of individualized justice, 
patterned behaviors that resemble routines are developed among the members of 
the courtroom workgroup in the name of expeditious disposal (Flemming, 
Nardulli, and Eisenstein, 1992). Due to various restraints, actors involved in the 
processing of criminal cases partially routinize their decision-making in order to 
ensure that cases that appear similar are treated similarly and that cases can be 
disposed of in a consistent manner. 
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 Although in theory all courtroom actors are equal, this is not the case in 
practice. Instead, prosecutors maintain multiple advantages over courthouse rivals 
and play an outsized role in shaping courtroom routines. Their elected positions 
provide them with a political mandate from citizens that does not require 
neutrality when prosecuting a criminal case (Flemming et al., 1992). In contrast, 
judges are expected to avoid political stances altogether and instead maintain a 
neutral position over the processing of cases. Opposite the prosecutor, the defense 
attorney arguably possesses the least amount of influence over the workgroup 
largely due to their limited control over consequential decisions. In an 
environment where uncertainty and conflict are to be avoided, the goals and the 
patterns of the most powerful actor, the prosecutor, tend to exert influence over 
the patterned responses to criminal cases within a workgroup. 
Within prosecutor offices, norms and patterns are developed to guide 
decision-making (Frederick & Stemen, 2012). These norms help to determine 
which cases should be dismissed or prosecuted, which warrant a charge reduction, 
and the acceptable value of a plea bargain. During the course of their work 
courtroom actors gain a sense for which cases are more typical than others. Doing 
so helps to ensure that solutions to problems are not continually reinvented, and 
that defendants in similar cases receive similar treatment (Flemming et al., 1992). 
Over time, notions of what constitutes a “normal crime,” or a crime whose typical 
characteristics are known and well established, are developed by both the 
prosecutor and public defender in the course of their work (Sudnow, 1965). The 
typicality of a given case will influence how it will be processed. Cases that are 
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perceived to contain the characteristics of a typical offender for the charged 
offense will be seen as more convictable. How well a case fits the profile of what 
courtroom actors have deemed to be normal will have an effect on whether formal 
charges are filed, and the subsequent negotiation process involved in crafting a 
plea agreement (Sudnow, 1965). 
New prosecutors are socialized by more experienced mentors to accept 
and understand the philosophies that are to be adhered to and guide the decisions 
made by members of the prosecution unit (Frederick & Stemen, 2012). This 
acculturation functions to ensure that their decisions are in line with what has 
been established as the accepted norms. Which cases are declined at screening, 
how cases are charged, and the conditions which are seen as acceptable within a 
plea offer are governed by unit-level norms and policies (Frederick & Stemen, 
2012). 
 What constitutes a typical or “normal” crime is influenced by a variety of 
legal and extralegal factors. While criminal history is external to the facts of the 
case, it is often used as a key determining factor in deciding how to prosecute a 
case, sometimes trumping the strength of evidence itself (Frederick & Stemen, 
2012; Kutateladze & Lawson, 2018). Sudnow (1965) argues that over time 
defense attorneys develop a knowledge of the “typical manner in which offenses 
of given classes are committed, the social characteristics of the persons who 
regularly commit them, the features of the settings in which they occur, the types 
of victims often involved, and the like” (p.259). What constitutes a normal crime 
is largely determined by complex, courtroom-specific stereotypes that interact 
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with a variety of legal and extralegal factors such as defendant race and offense 
type. Certain racial or ethnic groups can come to be seen as the typical offenders 
of a given crime, with this notion being informed by past prosecutions. These 
conceptions of what characteristics comprise a typical case have the potential to 
affect prosecutor decision-making throughout the processing of a criminal case. 
Focal Concerns Theory 
Building upon previous sentencing research, Steffensmeier, Kramer, and 
Ulmer (1998) introduced their focal concerns theory in order to frame hypotheses 
about the effects of race, gender, and age on sentencing. Steffensmeier and 
colleagues argued that three main focal concerns exert influence on judges when 
deciding sentences: blameworthiness, community protection, and practical 
constraints and consequences. Blameworthiness is measured in terms of the 
seriousness of the offense and harm caused (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). When 
taking into account the blameworthiness of the defendant, judges are attempting 
to provide a punishment that is commensurate to the offense the defendant has 
committed. When considering the protection of the community, a judge’s goal is 
to evaluate the dangerousness of the offender and the risk of recidivism. In order 
to make such an evaluation, judges consider the offender’s criminal history, type 
of crime, drug dependency, education, and employment, among other things 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998). The final focal concern, practical constraints and 
consequences, explains that judges weigh concerns related to the working 
relationships with other criminal justice actors such as prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, as well as individual defendant considerations, such as the offender’s 
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“ability to do time” (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Judicial decision-making does 
not occur in a vacuum. Judges consider how a decision might affect existing 
relationships with the courtroom workgroup and the flow of cases. Sentencing 
decisions must also be made with consideration of the correctional resources 
currently available. Additionally, judges are concerned with the effect the 
sentence will have on the offender. They therefore consider the offender’s health, 
special needs, and family situation when deciding a sentence (Steffensmeier et al., 
1998). 
 Although originally developed to explain judicial decision-making, focal 
concerns theory has been extended and applied to prosecutorial decision-making 
in a number of studies (Kutateladze et al., 2014; Shermer & Johnson, 2010; Spohn 
et al., 2001; Vance et al., 2019). According to this perspective, prosecutors are 
concerned with the same three focal concerns as judges, but the nature of these 
concerns may vary (Spohn et al., 2001). Unlike judges, prosecutors are not 
concerned with the social costs of punishment, but rather focus on the likelihood 
of conviction. This distinction is unsurprising given the difference in roles of 
judges and prosecutors. While judges are involved in the final stage of case 
processing, prosecutors are involved in multiple stages, and therefore have a 
“downstream orientation” that forces them to consider how a decision at the 
current stage will affect the case at a later stage (Frohmann, 1997). 
In order to assess convictability, prosecutors may rely on a “perceptual 
shorthand” to predict how the defendant will be viewed by the judge and jury 
(Spohn et al., 2001), incorporating stereotypes linked to the defendant’s race, 
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gender, and age. In the absence of complete information, they rely on stereotypes 
to assess the likelihood of conviction when deciding how aggressively to pursue a 
case. As argued by Sudnow (1965), negotiations between the prosecution and 
defense are often dictated by how well a case fits a profile developed by these 
courtroom actors over years of experience. I argue that it is within this framework 
of routinized decision-making that courtroom actors employ typescripts to 
efficiently compare a current case to past cases and evaluate its strength. 
Courtroom-specific typescripts allow actors to develop a profile of the typical 
offender against which current cases can be judged. These typescripts inform the 
prosecutors perceptual shorthand and influence the processing of a criminal case. 
Typescripts Theory 
 First developed by Harris (1977), typescripts theory describes a process in 
which social hierarchies are maintained through the assignment of social roles and 
behaviors to different groups of people. In this process individuals are prescribed 
social roles based on “type.” A type describes a characteristic such as race, 
gender, or age, and an individual can simultaneously be more than one type (i.e., 
male and black are both a “type”). Every “type” is accompanied by a socially 
defined “script” which dictates where each type belongs in the social hierarchy 
and how each type should behave. Such assignments help to reenforce and 
maintain the current societal power structure. For example, Harris (1977: 11) 
argues that “in American society, the assignment of blacks to the ghetto, women 
to the home and poor to the factory represent examples which have met the 
function of preserving white, male, middle-class dominance.”  
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Typescripts function to define the types of actors for which certain behaviors are 
expected an acceptable. In sum, typescripts are “institutionally supported, high 
communality expectancies that align types of actors with likely, unlikely, and 
impossible types of behaviors and identities, including both nondeviant and 
deviant behaviors and identities” (Harris, 1993: 167). 
Typescripts allow individuals to have “prewritten” scripts which can be 
used to assess a situation or person, providing a shortcut for decision-makers 
(Harris, 1977). Indeed, a key function of typescripts is as a decision-making 
heuristic that helps to routinize otherwise complicated judgements. Social cues 
are important for processing information and understanding one’s social 
environment (Sealock and Simpson, 1998). Typescripts provide people with a 
framework for efficiently processing social cues and making judgements on the 
character and typical actions of individuals they encounter. In other words, 
“typescripts structure society so as to make it readily understandable and 
predictable to its members” (Sealock and Simpson, 1998: 430). Typescripts allow 
decision makers to efficiently judge the character of an individual and his or her 
typical behavior, though possibly at the expense of accuracy. Those who follow 
the expected behaviors assigned to a particular type are following their prescribed 
typescript. These individuals likely make decision-making easier for courtroom 
actors, as their description and behavior conveniently match preconceived notions 
held by these actors. Those who do not exhibit the behavior expected from their 
type are classified as “countertypes” (Sealock & Simpson, 1998). These 
individuals likely require a more rigorous evaluation. 
 39 
In addition to individuals being classified into types, crimes are typed in a 
similar manner. Offenses are often typed by race, with some crimes defined as 
being within the arena of one race, but not another. The type for general deviant 
behavior would be a black male of low socio-economic status, and the 
countertype would be a white female of high socio-economic status (Sealock & 
Simpson, 1998). Crimes can also be gender typed, with certain deviance seen as 
“male deviance” while other types of deviance seen as the arena of females. Male-
typed offenses are ones that involve notions of masculinity and skills that are 
normally attributed to men. Female-typed offenses are ones that are 
disproportionately committed by females and follow traditional ideas of 
femininity (Sealock & Simpson, 1998). Crimes that have been committed with a 
level of parity between the genders would be typed as gender-neutral. 
As previously stated, typescripts as a heuristic help to routinize and 
expedite difficult decisions. This is of particular importance in the criminal 
courtroom, where speed and efficient processing of cases is often seen as a 
primary goal (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977). In addition, the availability, or 
scarcity, of resources exerts pressure on the courtroom actors. Personnel 
availability and scheduled court hours determine the framework within which 
prosecutors must operate (Frederick & Stemen, 2012). These practical constraints 
often increase pressure to make efficient processing of criminal cases the main 
focus of a court system. Therefore, filtering out cases that have a high probability 
of resulting in trial and a possible acquittal is a top priority. In order to do so, 
prosecutors attempt to determine the likelihood of conviction in a hypothetical 
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trial when screening a case (Spohn et al., 2001). It is here where the use of 
typescripts heuristics likely proves particularly useful. Cases that fit the profile of 
a common typescript are likely seen as more convictable than those that don’t, 
and their prosecution would likely to be more routine. Cases that are seen as 
countertypes, or not possessing enough of the features of a normal crime, are 
likely seen as less convictable. There will not be a routinized procedure for these 
countertypes, and the outcome of these cases is likely to be less predictable. 
 The evaluation of convictability is dynamic in case processing, and 
certain countertypical cases might instead be viewed as especially convictable, 
especially as they are evaluated at later decision points (Harris and Hill, 1986). In 
earlier stages of criminal case processing such as arrest, the behavior of 
countertypes is more likely to be seen as a singular, anomalous, mistake and not 
an indication of typical behavior and risk of future offending. According to the 
logic of the theory, an accusation of robbery levied against a white female is 
likely to be dismissed by a police officer because such criminal deviance is seen 
as unlikely or even impossible from that type of actor (Hill, 1977). This is likely 
to be the case in any situation where the alleged behavior does not match the 
individual’s ascribed type. As a result, countertypes are less likely to be arrested 
and subsequently entered into the justice system (Sealock and Simpson, 1998). 
This filtering of countertypes at early decision points in a criminal case increases 
the rarity of countertypes in later stages. However, it is possible that in some cases 
this rarity conveys a notion of increased culpability. Case processors might view 
the mere presence of a countertype at a decision point where most countertypes 
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have already been filtered out, such as sentencing, as an indication of guilt and 
high risk of recidivism. These late node countertypes are thus unique and require 
a treatment outside the normal, routinized bargaining and discounts applied to 
types. Indeed, Sudnow (1965) argued that atypical cases that pass multiple 
decision points are seen as requiring more aggressive prosecution compared to 
archetypal normal crimes. 
Prosecutors, as well as other members of the courtroom workgroup, aim to 
efficiently process cases and avoid uncertainty in their outcomes. A focus on 
routinizing the prosecution of cases by comparing the case at hand to past cases 
that were successfully prosecuted aids efficiency by decreasing the likelihood of 
trials and lengthy legal battles, thus achieving the goals of the courtroom 
workgroup. However, with efficiency and trial avoidance being of utmost 
importance, prosecutorial decision-making is made susceptible to bias and 
extralegal influence. A reliance on typescript heuristics allows courtroom actors 
to maintain an efficient flow of cases, but it also creates opportunities for unequal 
treatment of defendants at various decision points. 
The Function of Focal Concerns and Typescripts within the Courtroom 
 Criminal courts function as organizations within which actors share 
common goals. Among the most important goals are efficiency and certainty. 
Though performing different roles, members of the workgroup ultimately work 
together to ensure that these goals are achieved. As a result, patterned responses 
are developed to respond to problems faced by the entire workgroup, as well as 
those faced by each individual actor. Courtroom decisions are dictated by the 
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three focal concerns of blameworthiness, protection of the community, and 
practical constraints and consequences (Steffensmeier et al., 1998), and both 
prosecutors and judges are concerned with maintaining the stable flow of cases 
and working relationships with other courtroom actors. 
In order to maintain a steady flow of cases, prosecutors and judges often 
rely on a “perceptual shorthand” to make decisions more efficiently. This 
perceptual shorthand is informed by prevailing typescripts that define which 
characteristics a typical defendant should possess for a given crime.  The creation 
of typescripts that describe the typical offender of a crime type is influenced by 
both stereotypes held by the general population in everyday society, as well as 
courtroom experience. While broad cultural stereotypes influence the typescripts 
used within the courtroom, they are not necessarily the driving force behind their 
creation. In case processing it is often the stereotypes derived from past 
experiences that dictate what constitutes a “normal crime” (Sudnow, 1965). In 
developing perceptions of normal crimes, court actors create typescripts that 
describe traits an offender of a specific crime will most likely possess (Steen, 
Engen, & Gainey, 2005). Certain criminal deviances will be expected, and more 
believable, from certain classes of people. These typescripts are used as a method 
for evaluating the perceived culpability of the defendant and their risk of 
reoffending. According to Hill and colleagues, “typescripts serve, in a word, as a 
heuristic that guides the processor in making likelihood and utility estimates” 
(1985: 149). Thus, defendants that meet the type for a given crime will be 
perceived to have a higher propensity for reoffending in the future because the 
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offense is within their normal range of behavior. In effect, these defendants will 
be considered more convictable. 
Previous research testing typescripts theory have returned somewhat 
mixed results. For example, Best and Luckenbill (1990) performed a study testing 
Harris’ assertion that the rate of female to male deviance would be lower in 
societies where male dominance was greater. The researchers used homicide and 
imprisonment data from 1980 to test the hypothesis across all fifty U.S. states. 
Their results did not support the theory, however, and male dominance, measured 
by two indices, was positively related to female homicide rates and unrelated to 
female imprisonment. Best and Luckenbill (1990) argued that the results 
suggested the theory needed to be refined, and that it should consider the 
possibility that typescripts may encourage some forms of female deviance, while 
still discouraging other forms. 
Despite Best and Luckenbill’s (1990) findings, other studies testing the 
theory suggest typescripts are employed by criminal justice actors in ways that 
affect their decision-making. In an investigation of police decisions to arrest, 
Sealock and Simpson (1998) employed typescripts theory in an effort to uncover 
the role of race, gender, socioeconomic status, and offense types in police 
decision-making. Partial support was found for assumptions made by the theory 
and the assertion that “countertypes are likely to be treated more leniently than 
types at the beginning of juvenile justice processing because police will judge that 
the type has a substantially greater chance of showing the “negative” trait … than 
does the countertype” (Sealock and Simpson, 1998). The researchers found that 
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previous arrests increased the likelihood of arrest to a greater extent for female 
suspects than male suspects across all offense types. It was also found that 
females were less likely to be arrested for male-typed and neutral offenses, but 
more likely to be arrested for female-typed offenses, when compared to males. 
However, causing physical injury or monetary damage in the course of 
committing an offense was equally influential in the decision to arrest for males 
and females, which was not in support of the theory (Sealock and Simpson, 1998). 
The researchers identified key limitations and suggested future research should 
examine how individuals are moved through various nodes of the justice system 
to gain more insight into the operation of typescripts within it. 
In a study of the role of typescripts in the final sentencing decision, Steen, 
Engen, and Gainey (2005) found that defendants who fit the description of a 
“dangerous drug dealer” had a higher chance of being incarcerated and received 
longer sentences when compared to offenders that did not fit the stereotype 
description. However, the magnitude of these findings varied by race, as the 
effects fitting the description were greater for white defendants compared to black 
defendants. Engen and colleagues (2005) argued this was due to the especially 
lenient treatment of white defendants who do not fit the description of a 
dangerous drug dealer compared to black defendants that do not fit the stereotype. 
These results provide evidence for both focal concerns and typescripts theories in 
sentencing. Given this support, it is an important next step for researchers to 
examine these relationships within the context of earlier case processing 
decisions. 
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 Focal concerns and typescripts theories are able to explain patterns of 
decision-making within the context of the courtroom workgroup. Applying the 
theoretical framework outlined above to prosecutorial decision-making is likely to 
enhance the understanding of how these actors operate and the results of the 
decisions they make. A deeper understanding of how prosecutor offices process 
cases will provide additional knowledge to the field of criminology that will be 
useful for academics and policy makers alike. Prosecutors have a critical role in 
the processing of criminal cases, but their contributions to issues such as racial 
disparities within case outcomes and mass incarceration are not fully known. The 
investigation of how race and gender might interact with legal factors to produce 
disparate outcomes in case processing is a necessary step towards filling the gaps 
in the current literature. 
What Makes a Type? 
 For this study, I am proposing that the description of a typical defendant, 
or type, is composed of four characteristics: race, gender, criminal history, and 
defense counsel. The race of the defendant is an unignorable characteristic that 
can trigger both implicit and explicit biases in charging decisions. Furthermore, as 
previously outlined, some studies have found that defendant race influences 
prosecutorial decision-making (Henning and Feder, 2005; Pyrooz et al., 2011; 
Kutateladze et al., 2014; Kutateladze, 2018). In addition, given documented 
difference in offending patterns across racial categories (Piquero and Brame, 
2008), prosecutors may allow aggregate crime patterns to influence their 
evaluation of a single defendant. A similar argument can be made about gender. 
 46 
Given the well-documented gender gap in crime (Lauritsen, Heimer, and Lynch, 
2009; Choy, Raine, Venables, and Farrington, 2017), it is likely that crime is seen 
as atypical for females, and female defendants are viewed as special, anomalous 
cases. 
Steffensmeier and colleagues (1998) surmised that criminal history was 
one of the key characteristics that judges use to evaluate the defendant’s 
dangerousness and risk of recidivism.  
Prosecutors also use criminal history as an important tool to help guide decisions 
(Kurlychek and Johnson, 2019). Prior arrests or convictions for the same crime 
the defendant is charged with would help create a more convincing argument of 
guilt for the current charge. Additionally, a criminal history that includes various 
other offenses would likely be seen as an indication of high risk and general 
criminality. Even if the defendant had previously never been arrested or convicted 
of the current charge, other prior offenses might signal to prosecutors that the 
current offense is within the normal behavior of the defendant. Therefore, it is 
more believable that the defendant did commit the crime he or she is currently 
charged with and is likely to reoffend in the future. 
In addition to criminal history, Steffensmeier and colleagues (1998) stated 
that some socioeconomic factors such as education and employment will be taken 
into consideration when making evaluations of dangerousness and risk of 
recidivism. Furthermore, Hill (1977) argues that street crime is reserved for “the 
poor.” On the other side, such criminality is perceived as nearly impossible for 
high class identities. While information on a defendant’s education and 
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employment is out of the scope of the data being used in this study, type of 
defense counsel can be used a proxy for socioeconomic status more generally. 
Although the type of defense counsel representing a defendant is an imperfect 
proxy for socioeconomic status, it has been used for this purpose in previous 
research (Kutateladze et al., 2014). The argument for doing so is that defendants 
who are supplied an attorney by the court likely cannot afford a private attorney, 
and therefore come from a lower socioeconomic background. Conversely, those 
who pay for private representation are more likely to come from a higher 
socioeconomic background. 
Typescripts theorists argue that the typescripts upheld by society are those 
that help to maintain current power structures (Sealock and Simpson, 1998). The 
current power structure of the United States is one of considerable economic and 
racial inequality, and these inequities extend to the criminal justice system. As a 
result, the incarcerated and justice-involved population within the United States is 
a reflection of the dominant typescripts for criminality. These typescripts dictate 
that criminal behavior is most often exhibited by low-income minority, 
particularly Black and Hispanic, males. This is supported by the fact that males 
made up 93% of the incarcerated population as of 2018, and Black males are 
imprisoned at a rate 5.8 times greater than White males, while Hispanic males are 
incarcerated at a rate 2.6 times greater (Carson, 2020). Furthermore, criminal 
history is often used as a tool for determining risk of reoffending (Steffensmeier 
et al., 1998), and individuals who come from a low socioeconomic background 
are more likely to be imprisoned later in life than those that come from a more 
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privileged socioeconomic background (Looney and Turner, 2018). Given this 
information, I argue that the dominant typescript prescribing criminal behavior 
will be a low socioeconomic Black or Hispanic male with a criminal history. 
However, prosecution patterns for a given jurisdiction are also subject to local 
variations in prevailing typescripts based on unique population demographics. 
Therefore, the data will be examined in Chapter 4 of the study to determine if the 
characteristics most commonly found among the defendants for each crime type 
match the above description. 
Hypotheses 
 
During case processing, prosecutors will try to avoid prosecuting cases 
that they do not deem likely to end in a conviction in order to focus their energy 
on defendants they perceive as more convictable (Frederick and Stemen, 2012). 
The perceptual shorthand used by prosecutors to expedite their decision-making 
likely manifests itself in the form of typescripts which are subsequently used to 
assess the convictability of a case and determine how aggressively he or she will 
prosecute it. In addition to legal and evidentiary factors, prosecutors will consider 
the typicality of the defendant and how they might be perceived by a jury if the 
case were to go to trial (Spohn et al., 2001). Defendants will be viewed as more 
convictable when the characteristics of their case match the most common 
characteristics of defendants previously accused of similar crimes. Thus, 
prosecuting a case that involves a type will be seen as a safer bet than prosecuting 
a case that involves a countertype. If this theory is correct, prosecutors will be 
more willing to prosecute cases that are deemed to fit the profile of a normal 
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crime. If true, this would add support to the findings that, absent confounding 
information, types are generally more likely to be pursued in the justice system 
than countertypes (Sealock and Simpson, 1998). 
Hypothesis 1: Cases that match the characteristics of a “normal crime” 
typescript will be less likely to have their cases dismissed at any point than 
cases that do not. 
Although types will be perceived as more convictable than countertypes, 
this does not necessarily translate into harsher punishment. Instead, the processing 
of types is likely to be more routine than the processing of countertypes. As 
Sudnow (1963) theorized, standardized plea discounts are constructed between 
prosecutors and public defenders for normal crimes. In contrast, the countertypes 
that were not filtered out at earlier stages will not be subject to routinized plea 
deals because there are little to no precedents set for such cases due to their rarity. 
Thus, it is hypothesized that in cases possessing the characteristics of a normal 
crime, the defendant will be more likely to receive a plea deal that includes a 
charge reduction. 
Hypothesis 2: For cases that end in a guilty plea, cases that match the 
description of a “normal crime” typescript will be more likely to receive a charge 
reduction than cases that do not. 
Working backward from the offense, courtroom actors construct an image 
of the typical offender that is used as a heuristic for evaluating the convictability 
of a case. As a result, decision makers categorize certain groups of people that 
possess stereotypical characteristics as types, while categorizing those that don’t 
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possess them as countertypes. The creation of normal crime typescripts aids 
decision makers in their goal of maintaining courtroom relationships and a steady 
flow of cases by routinizing decisions that would otherwise be extremely difficult 
to make. Defendants categorized as types will be processed routinely, while 
decision-making involving countertypes will require an individualized calculation 
of how similar or different the defendant is from the constructed stereotype (Steen 
et al., 2005). In addition, all countertypes will not look the same. Instead, the 
universe of countertypes will consist of a wide variety of defendant descriptions, 
whereas types largely follow a single description. Therefore, the individualized 
treatment given to countertypical cases is likely to result in defendants waiting 
longer for their case to be disposed, on average, when compared to types. In 
addition, it is likely that there will be greater variability in the time from screening 
to disposition for countertypes when compared to types. It is hypothesized that 
length of time between arrest and disposition, and the standard deviation around 
the average time to disposition will be greater for countertypes. 
Hypothesis 3: Among cases that end in a conviction, the time elapsed 
between the filing of criminal charges and case disposition will be shorter 
for cases that match the description of a “normal crime” typescript 
compared to cases that do not. 
Hypothesis 4: Among cases that end in a conviction, there will be greater 
variability in the average time between screening and disposition for cases 
that do not match the description of a “normal crime” typescript. 
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By definition, countertypes will always be rarer than types. The rarity of 
countertypes will increase as they are passed to later decision-making nodes due 
to many of them being filtered out. In the earlier stages of a criminal case, starting 
from the decision to arrest, the abnormality of countertypes will be reason for 
them to be filtered out. The criminal behavior can more easily be determined a 
singular occurrence that is not indicative of the individual’s overall behavior. 
However, those countertypes that are passed along to later nodes will not be 
subject to the same leniency. Their presence in later decision points despite the 
high selectivity of previous points will signal to decision-makers that there is 
something unique about the case that requires special treatment (Harris and Hill, 
1986). In regard to case processing, “normal crime” types will be handled 
routinely, and their speedy disposition will be prioritized (Sudnow, 1965). Most 
countertypes, on the other hand, will be filtered out at arrest and case screening, 
and those that remain will be perceived as especially culpable. This distinction is 
likely to be most visible at sentencing, the final stage of case processing. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that convicted cases involving countertypes will 
receive harsher sentences than cases involving types. 
Hypothesis 5: For all cases that end in a conviction, cases that match the 
description of a “normal crime” typescript will be less likely to receive a 
custodial sentence than cases that do not. 
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Chapter 4: Data and Methods 
 
 The dataset for this research project contains information on case 
processing practices within the District Attorney of New York County (DANY). 
The data were collected over a 20-month period between the years 2010 and 
2011, as part of a research project funded by the National Institute of Justice that 
involved the Vera Institute of Justice (Kutateladze, 2016). Vera’s partnership with 
the District Attorney of New York gave researchers rare access to case processing 
data in a large, diverse jurisdiction (Kutateladze et al., 2014). In Manhattan, 
police first bring cases to DANY’s Early Case Assessment Bureau (ECAB). It is 
here where assistant district attorneys (ADA) decide whether to accept or decline 
each case, as well as which charges to formally file against the defendant 
(Kutateladze et al., 2014). Misdemeanor and felony cases that are accepted are 
brought in for arraignment, typically within 24 hours of arrest, where they are 
informed of the charges against them and judges make a decision regarding 
pretrial detention. After arraignment, felony cases are brought before a grand jury, 
while misdemeanors are moved to all-purpose parts of the criminal court. Felony 
cases that receive an indictment are then sent to the Supreme Court,2 where the 
defendant has the option to plead guilty or go to trial. Defendants are able to plead 
guilty at multiple stages in case processing, but any plea must be approved by the 
presiding judge (Kutateladze et al., 2014). 
The dataset contains information on 159,206 misdemeanors and 26,069 
felony cases prosecuted by DANY’s office during a 20-month period between 
 
2 In New York State the Supreme Court is a trial court that oversees both criminal and civil court 
cases.  
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2010 and 2011. However, cases that were missing the defendant’s race and gender 
were dropped from the analysis.3 Cases were classified as misdemeanor or felony 
based on the “screening charge” rather than “arrest charge” because the screening 
charge reflects a formal charging decision, while the arrest charge does not 
(Kutateladze, et al., 2014). The analysis focuses on a subset of the most common 
felony cases whose top charge is categorized as either a non-marijuana felony 
drug offense, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, or other felony theft (n = 
18,691). These specific offenses are categorized into three offense types: drug 
offenses, person offenses, and property offenses.4 The final dataset allows for the 
investigation of prosecutorial decision-making at multiple decision points 




This study uses four separate dependent variables to measure outcomes at 
multiple points in case processing. The first outcome examined is whether a case 
was dismissed after screening, measured by a binary variable (1 = dismissed, 0 = 
fully prosecuted). The second dependent variable is whether or not a defendant 
received a charge reduction (1 = reduction, 0 = no reduction). This variable is 
defined as a reduction in the severity of the top charge at final disposition 
 
3 Out of the 26,069 felony cases in the original dataset, 239 (0.009%) were missing data on 
defendant race, 38 (0.0015%) were classified as “other” for defendant race, and 124 (0.005%) 
were missing data on defendant gender. Due to the small quantity of missing values, these cases 
were excluded from the analysis. 
4 The specific offenses included in each category and their corresponding statutes are as follows: 
Drug offenses –Controlled Substance Offenses (New York Penal Law §220.00, Title M); Person 
offenses – Assault and related offenses (§120.00, Title H), Robbery (§160.00, Title J); Property 
offenses – Burglary and related offenses (§140.00, Title I), Larceny (§155.00, Title J), Other 
offenses related to theft (§165.00, Title J). 
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compared to case screening, when the prosecutor formally filed charges. The third 
dependent variable is a binary measure for whether, upon conviction, the 
defendant received a custodial sentence (1 = custodial sentence, 0 = non-custodial 
sentence). The fourth and final dependent variable measures the length of a case, 
measured as the total number of days between the filing of criminal charges and 
final case disposition. 
 
Independent Variables 
 The primary independent variable is a binary variable measuring whether 
a person is a type or a countertype, coded “1” if the defendant met the description 
of a type, and “0” if they did not. Normal crime typescripts are based on a 
constellation of four factors readily available to the prosecutor: criminal history, 
defense counsel, race, and gender. For the purposes of typescript construction, a 
defendant is defined as having a criminal history if he or she has been previously 
arrested or convicted of a crime.5 Both measures are included because not all 
defendants with prior convictions had prior arrests on their record, and vice 
versa.6 In addition, prosecutors consider both prior arrests and prior convictions 
 
5 To test the sensitivity of the results, models were run that measured criminal history as only “one 
or more arrests,” as well as only “one or more convictions” separately. Classifying criminal 
history solely as prior arrests resulted in a typescript that represented a much smaller portion of 
DANY defendants. This was also the case when classifying criminal history solely as prior 
convictions. Table 2 shows that when using either alternative measure of criminal history, the 
portion of defendants who match the “normal crime” typescript is reduced considerably. In 
addition, effects of these alternative classifications on the outcome variables of interest are not 
substantially different overall from the classification used in the main analysis (see Table 18).  
6 Out of the entire sample (n = 18,691), 2,455 defendants had a prior arrest but no prior conviction 
on their record. Conversely, 1,210 defendants had a prior conviction but no prior arrest on their 
record. The latter statistic is unexpected, as most convictions should follow an arrest. 
Unfortunately, no information on how the DANY collects criminal history data that would explain 
this discrepancy is provided in the dataset documentation provided by ICPSR or the final report 
provided the Vera Institute (Kutateladze and Andiloro, 2014). However, it is possible that the 
 55 
when negotiating plea deals (Kutateladze and Lawson, 2016). Defense counsel 
describes whether the defendant hired a private attorney or was supplied with a 
public defender. The racial categories included in the data are Black, White, 
Hispanic, and Asian. The defendant’s gender is measured as male or female.  
I argue that for each offense type, the description of a normal crime 
typescript will be defined by a combination of these four factors. Examining the 
case processing outcomes for types compared to countertypes will help to explain 
the unique, interactive impact of these combinations of variables, above and 
beyond the main effects of each individual variable. The offense types being 
analyzed are drug, person, and property offenses. A description of the precise 
combination of factors constructing the typescript for each offense category is 
presented below and descriptive statistics for the typescript categories are 
presented in Table 1. 
-Insert Table 1 about here- 
Drug Offender Type 
The drug offense category includes all cases that involved a non-marijuana 
felony possession or distribution crime as the top charge.7 For drug offenses, 
48.16% of all felony offenders processed by the DANY office were Black and 
41.37% were Hispanic. These are the two most common racial categories and 
 
DANY has incomplete arrest data for crimes committed outside of New York County, which 
would result in an inflated number of defendants who are coded as having a prior conviction yet 
no prior arrest. 
7 Felony marijuana cases were excluded from the analysis for two reasons. First, the majority of 
marijuana cases are prosecuted as misdemeanors and therefore felony marijuana cases are 
infrequent (n = 249). Second, given that the vast majority of marijuana cases are prosecuted as 
misdemeanors, those that are prosecuted as felonies are likely cases related to large-scale 
distribution and therefore unique when compared to the other drug felonies. 
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combine to represent 89.53% of felony drug defendants. In addition, 87.64% of 
all defendants were male, 73.59% had a criminal history, and 84.64% were 
represented by a public defender. The typical drug offender processed by the 
District Attorney of New York County, then, can be described as a Black or 
Hispanic male with a criminal history who is represented by a public defense 
lawyer. Of all defendants initially charged with a felony drug offense, 55.05% 
meet the description of an archetypal drug offender. 
Person Offender Type 
 The person offense category includes defendants charged with felony 
assault or robbery, the two most common violent felony offenses. Among these 
offenses, 53.82% of all defendants processed were Black and 34.93% were 
Hispanic. Combined, these two racial categories make up 88.75% of all felony 
defendants who were initially charged with a violent offense. In total, 84.07% of 
defendants were male, 55.47% had a prior arrest or conviction,8 and 85.93% had a 
public defender serve as their counsel. Therefore, the typical person offender 
processed by the District Attorney of New York County can be described as a 
Black or Hispanic male with a criminal history who is represented by a public 
defense lawyer. Of all defendants who were initially charged with a person 
offense, 42.88% meet the description of a person offender typescript. 
Property Offender Type 
 
8 For the individual offenses included in the person offenses category, 48.1% of assault cases 
involved defendants with a criminal history, while 62.76% of defendants charged with robbery 
had a criminal history. 
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 The property offense category is limited to felony cases involving 
burglary, larceny, and theft. Among defendants charged within these offenses, 
48.65% were Black and 30.64% were Hispanic, combining to represent 79.29% 
of defendants. In addition, 74.42% of defendants were male, 53.1% had 
previously been arrested or convicted of a crime,9 and 80.97% were represented 
by a public defender. Therefore, the typical property offender processed by the 
District Attorney of New York County can also be described as a Black or 
Hispanic male with a criminal record being represented by a public defense 
lawyer. Of all defendants who were initially charged with a felony property 
offense, 34.42% meet the description of a property offender typescript. 
Table 2 presents the frequency and percentage for the constructed 
typescript within the full sample, as well as the three offense-specific subsamples. 
In order to demonstrate that the constructed typescripts represent the most 
common groupings, comparison groups and their frequencies are reported as well. 
Across all three offense categories, the constructed typescript is the modal 
grouping of the four variables of interest, and thus represents a typical defendant 
for each offense type. 





9 For the individual offenses included in the person offenses category, 76.42% of burglary 
defendants, 43.6% of larceny defendants, and 47.87% of felony theft defendants had a criminal 
record. 
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 Several variables were included in order to measure and account for legal 
and case factors. Statutory Severity of the primary offense is included, which 
captures the seriousness of the top charge via a series of dummy variables for five 
felony classes (A, B, C, D, and E). However, not all five dummy variables are 
included in each analysis, as not all offense types are categorized under all five 
felony classes. For example, no drug crimes included in the analysis are 
categorized as Class E felonies and therefore, this category is not included in the 
drug offense models. Class A felonies are excluded from the Person and Property 
offense analyses for the same reason. Class D Felony is used as the reference 
group for all three offense types because it is the most common felony 
classification, regardless of offense type. The number of charges and number of 
criminal counts that a defendant received at screening are measured as continuous 
variables.  
It is important to note that while the inclusion or exclusion of criminal 
history in each typescript was based on the binary question of whether or not the 
majority of defendants had previously been arrested or convicted of one or more 
crimes, for the purposes of the final analyses, criminal record is broken into two 
separate dummy variables, Prior Arrest and Prior Conviction. Although prior 
arrests and prior convictions are both forms of a criminal history, and a prosecutor 
has knowledge of both when evaluating a case, the two measures may have 
independent effects on prosecutorial decision-making. Therefore, these measures 
are included separately. These variables are separated in the final models in order 
to account for differences in the interpretation of prior arrests and convictions. 
 59 
They are dichotomized in order to adjust for skewness. The effects of defense 
attorney type are controlled for using the dichotomous variable Public Defender 
(1 = public defender, 0 = no public defender). In addition, the existence of a 
considerable number of missing values for attorney type poses a problem for the 
analysis. Given the quantity of missing values for this variable (n = 1,593), 
strategies such as listwise deletion are not appropriate. Instead, those with an 
unknown attorney type are controlled for with the binary variable Missing 
Counsel (1 = missing counsel, 0 = counsel known).10 The third category of 
defense counsel, private attorney, is used as the reference category. 
The effects of pretrial detention are controlled for using a dichotomous 
variable measuring whether the defendant was held in pretrial detention (1 = 
pretrial detention, 0 = no pretrial detention). I also control for the neighborhood of 
arrest using five dichotomous neighborhood variables: Harlem/Morningside 
Heights, Midtown to Financial District – West, Midtown to Financial District – 
East, and Outside Manhattan. The Upper West Side and Upper East Side 
neighborhoods, the two most affluent in New York County, are combined to form 
the reference category (see Kutateladze and Andiloro, 2014: 34). Lastly, the 
defendant’s age is measured using a continuous variable recorded at case 
 
10 In addition to being large in quantity, the cases with unknown defense attorney type differ from 
other cases in three key ways. First, these cases overwhelmingly end in a case dismissal (76.46% 
of cases missing defense counsel ended in a case dismissal after screening, compared to 33.81% of 
cases that were not missing this information). Second, 34.53% of cases missing defense counsel 
type have a criminal history, while 62.18% of cases with a known defense attorney type have a 
criminal history. Third, these cases tend to be ones with a very long time between screening and 
disposition (the average time to disposition for cases with unknown defense counsel is 4,060 days, 
compared to 188 days for those with a known attorney type). Therefore, it appears these cases may 
never have been assigned a defense attorney, possibly due to the defendants in the cases being 
fugitives. These cases are therefore unique, and strategies for missing data such as multiple 
imputation by chained equations (MICE) would be inappropriate. 
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screening. Summary statistics for the proposed dependent, independent and 
control variables are provided and described in additional detail in the next 
chapter.  
Analytical Strategy 
 The proposed analytical plan uses logistic and Poisson regression models 
to test the relationship between typescript status and case processing outcomes, 
after controlling for other relevant factors. In addition, Levene’s tests for the 
equality of variance were performed to test the hypothesis that there will be a 
greater variability in the  time to disposition for countertype cases. Levene’s test 
is used to determine if k samples have equal variances. In this case, the two 
samples being compared are types and countertypes, repeated for each of the three 
offense types of interest. 
Logistic regression is appropriate for the dependent variables case 
dismissal, charge reduction, and custodial sentence because they are all binary. 
Poisson regression is used to estimate the relationship between typescript status 
and time between screening and disposition, given that Days to Disposition is a 
count variable. The Poisson model is appropriate because it does not require the 
dependent variable to be normally distributed and therefore is better suited for the 
skewed distribution of the Days to Disposition. Preliminary examinations of the 
data found evidence of overdispersion, which can lead to inefficient estimates and 
downward-biased standard errors in the Poisson model (Long, 1997). However, 
the Poisson was chosen over the alternative negative binomial model because the 
negative binomial does not solve the complications caused by overdispersion and 
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can instead lead to a false sense of confidence in the results when fundamental 
issues such as omitted variable bias remain (Berk and MacDonald, 2008). 
To answer the research questions, the models are estimated for the three 
offense type categories, resulting in nine logit and 3 Poisson models in total. The 
first model examines Case Acceptance, the second model Charge Reduction, and 
the third model Custodial Sentence as the dependent variable. The fourth and final 
model examines Days to Disposition as the dependent variable. For all models, 
the main independent variable of interest, Type, is a binary variable measuring 
whether the defendant fits the description of a type or countertype. The regression 








 Table 3 provides a correlation matrix between the dependent and 
typescript variables.  
An interesting pattern is seen when looking at the results for the Case Dismissal 
and Charge Reduction variables. Both Drug Offender Type and Property Offender 
Type are negatively correlated with Case Dismissal and positively correlated with 
Charge Reduction. These are the directions proposed by hypotheses 1 and 2, 
respectively. However, the correlations between Person Offender Type and Case 
Dismissal and Charge Reduction are in the opposite directions. Though these are 
simply correlations, the results suggest possible differences in the manner in 
which person offenses are processed. Each of the three typescript categories is 
negatively correlated with Days to Disposition, which is in line with hypothesis 3, 
which states that types will be processed more quickly than countertypes. 
Conversely, the positive correlations between all typescript categories and 
Custodial Sentence are contrary to hypothesis 5, which states that types will be 
less likely to receive a custodial sentence compared to countertypical defendants 
due to especially punitive treatment given to late node countertypes. 
–Insert Table 3 about here– 
Table 4 provides a correlation matrix between the typescripts and 
important control variables. The correlation between Criminal History and the 
three typescript categories is considerably high, though this is expected given that 
the individuals in these categories all have a criminal record. At .41, the 
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correlation between Criminal History and Pretrial Detention is also high, though 
this is again expected as defendants with a criminal record have a higher 
likelihood to be detained before trial (Pinchevsky and Steiner, 2016). At 0.53, 
Total Charge Counts is highly correlated with Total Charges. Given the high 
value for some of the reported Pearson’s correlation coefficients, variation 
inflation factors (VIFs) were calculated and reported in table 5 to test for 
multicollinearity. Only Criminal History and Public Defender were reported to 
have a VIF higher than 2, and had a value if 2.21 and 2.13, respectively. Neither 
of these values are high enough to cause serious concern about issues of 
multicollinearity in the final models (Wooldridge, 2016). 
–Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here– 
Table 6 provides the summary statistics for all variables to be included in 
the models. At 43%, slightly less than half of all defendants processed by the 
District Attorney of New York meet the description of a normal crime type for 
their charged offense. As previously discussed, the typescript categories do not 
represent the majority of all defendants processed for each offense type, but are 
the most common groupings of defendant race, gender, criminal history, and 
defense counsel variables by a large margin (see Table 2). Of all cases brought to 
the DANY office, 37% are dismissed at some point during case processing. This 
is noticeably higher for person offenses, at 49%, but lower for drug and property 
offenses, at 29% and 33% respectively. Out of all cases that ended in a 
conviction, 65% received a charge reduction. This rate does not change drastically 
for person and property offenses, but only 56% of drug defendants received a 
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charge reduction. For the defendants whose cases ended in a conviction, 59% 
received a custodial sentence upon conviction. The rate is notably lower for 
property offenses, at 51%, compared to 64% of drug cases and 61% of person 
offenses. The average amount of days between case screening and disposition for 
cases that ended in a conviction is 196.82 days. The average amount of days 
ranges from 168.99 to 216.76 when disaggregating by offense type.11 
Across both measures, drug cases saw the highest number of defendants 
with a criminal record, with 65% of defendants having one or more prior arrests 
and 62% having one or more prior convictions. About half of person offense 
defendants had previously been arrested, while 40% had previously been 
convicted of a crime. Similar numbers are seen for property offenses. Among all 
cases, Public Defender was the most common type of defense counsel at 84%. 
When disaggregating by offense type this number remains similar, with 85% of 
drug offense defendants, 86% of person offense defendants, and 81% of property 
offense defendants being represented by a public defender. A very small portion 
of defendants were represented by private counsel, between 7 and 9% depending 
on the offense type. 
The average amount of charges filed against defendants by the DANY 
office is roughly 2 and remains consistent across offense type. The average 
 
11 Due to a minority of outlier cases in each offense category whose length may skew the results of 
the analysis, alternate measures of Days to Disposition were examined. When top coded at the 95th 
percentile, the average amount of days to disposition is 175.69 for drug offense cases, 188.37 days 
for person offenses, and 153.93 days for property offenses. When cases that are missing 
information on defense counsel, which account for the vast majority of outliers, the average 
amount of days to disposition is 176.02 days for drug offense cases, 188.63 for person offenses, 
and 155.64 for property offenses. More information on these alternate measures is provided in the 
supplementary analyses section. 
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amount of criminal counts levied against a defendant is similar to that of charges, 
with the average defendant receiving 2.48 criminal counts per case. This number 
is similar across all three crime type categories. The most common felony 
classification was a Class D Felony, accounting for 35% of all crimes. Slightly 
more than half of all defendants were detained before trial at 55%, while drug 
offenses had the highest rate of defendants detained before trial at 67%. Most 
crime was concentrated in the Midtown to Downtown – West and Harlem 
neighborhoods, followed by the Upper West and East Side and Midtown to 
Downtown – East neighborhoods. Only 4% of cases originated outside of 
Manhattan. Additionally, the average defendant age was approximately 32, and 
ranges from 28 to 36 across the three offense types. 
–Insert Table 6 about here– 
Results from Logistic and Poisson Regressions 
 
 The results of the logistic regressions for the decision to dismiss a case at 
screening are reported in Table 7. A minimal number of cases are dropped from 
each of the analyses, resulting in a sample size of 5,358 for drug offenses, 6,602 
for person offenses, and 6,712 for property offenses. The effect of fitting the 
description of a normal crime typescript on case dismissal is in the hypothesized 
direction and significant for person offenses only. Consistent with hypothesis 1, 
defendants who matched the description of the normal crime typescript for a 
person offense had lower odds of case dismissal at any point after the screening 
stage. Specifically, the odds of the case being dismissed were approximately 14% 
lower in person offense cases. The effect of matching the description of a normal 
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crime typescript was not found to be significantly different from zero for drug and 
property offenses. The finding that the odds of having a case dismissed are 12% 
less for person offenses provides evidence for hypothesis 1, albeit limited given 
the lack of support for the other two offense types. Notably, this effect is net of 
the individual effects of offender race, gender, criminal history and type of 
counsel. 
–Insert Table 7 about here– 
 In addition to the effect of typescript status, interesting patterns arise 
amongst the control variable. For example, Hispanic defendants were more likely 
to have their case dismissed after screening when compared to White defendants 
across all three offense types. The same pattern is seen for Black defendants, 
though statistical significance is only achieved for property offenses. Though this 
can be seen as Black and Hispanic defendants receiving a benefit compared to 
White defendants, it might also indicate that the cases brought against them are 
weaker than those brought against White defendants due to racial biases in 
policing (Wooldredge and Thistlewaite, 2004). Defendants with prior convictions 
had lower odds of seeing their cases dismissed across all three models. This effect 
is especially strong for property crimes, with defendants with one or more prior 
convictions having roughly 24% lower odds of case dismissal. Additionally, 
defendants that were held in pretrial detention were significantly less likely to 
have their case dismissed. The odds of having the case dismissed for individuals 
who were held in pretrial detention were roughly 62% lower among drug cases, 
70% lower among person offenses, and 57% lower among property offenses. 
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Of particular interest in these models, cases that were missing information 
regarding defense counsel type were strongly correlated with case dismissal 
compared to cases represented by private attorneys. Specifically, the odds of a 
case dismissal among drug and property cases that were missing information on 
defense counsel were roughly six times greater compared to cases with private 
attorneys. Furthermore, the odds of a case dismissal for these defendants were 
roughly three times greater among person offense cases, after controlling for other 
factors. Given how much older these cases tend to be, sometimes spanning 
decades, it is unsurprising that they have greater odds to end in a case dismissal. 
However, it is unlikely that this relationship signifies that the odds of a case 
dismissal are much greater when a defendant refuses defense counsel. Instead, the 
abnormal length of these cases suggests that they likely involved fugitive 
defendants that successfully avoided the efforts of DANY prosecutors and other 
law enforcement officials. 
 Results of the logistic regressions for whether a charge reduction was 
included in the defendant’s plea deal are reported in Table 8. Because the data 
were restricted to cases that ended in a guilty plea, the sample size is reduced 
considerably for each model. Specifically, the sample size is 3,634 for drug 
offenses, 2,955 for person offenses, and 4,258 for property offenses. Across all 
three models examining charge reduction, no significant effect is observed for the 
typescript variable. Therefore, I find no evidence for hypothesis 2, which states 
that cases matching the description of a “normal crime” typescript will be more 
likely to receive a charge reduction compared to cases that do not. Despite a lack 
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of evidence for my hypothesis, noteworthy results are still found. For example, 
among person offense cases, Asian defendants had approximately 98% greater 
odds to receive a charge reduction compared to White defendants, net of other 
factors. It is possible that “model minority” stereotypes result in prosecutors 
viewing Asian defendants as less culpable, and therefore are more willing to offer 
charge reductions during plea bargaining. This is in line with previous research 
that has found that Asian defendants generally receive more lenient punishment 
outcomes within the court system (Johnson and Betsinger, 2009; Kutateladze et 
al., 2014). 
–Insert Table 8 about here– 
Surprisingly, defendants in person offense cases with one or more prior 
convictions had roughly 66% greater odds to receive a charge reduction when 
compared to defendants with no prior convictions. This result is unexpected but 
may signal an increased willingness to plead guilty among individuals with prior 
convictions, who likely face the possibility of more serious punishment outcomes 
compared to those without such a criminal history. Alternatively, the more serious 
nature of person offenses likely provides prosecutors with more alternative 
offenses to offer in a plea bargain. Indeed, Wright and Engen (2006: p. 1955) 
argue that the more “options available to the negotiating parties will give them 
more potential ways to find common ground, a sentencing discount that reflects 
their shared view about the value of the defendant’s waiver of trial rights.” 
Pretrial detention was again found to have a significant effect on whether 
the defendant received a charge reduction across all three offense types. The odds 
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of receiving a charge reduction as part of a plea deal for individuals who were 
held in pretrial detention were roughly 49% lower among drug cases, 53% less 
among person offenses, and 74% less among property offenses. Among drug 
cases that ended in a guilty plea, those who were missing information on defense 
counsel had roughly 81% greater odds to receive a charge reduction, compared to 
cases with private attorneys. The relationship between missing counsel and charge 
reduction is in the opposite direction for both person and property offenses. 
However, the coefficient for missing defense is statistically insignificant in the 
person offense model. Among property offense cases that ended in a plea deal, 
those who were missing information on defense counsel had roughly 43% lower 
odds to receive a charge reduction, compared to cases with known defense 
counsel type. 
Results from the Poisson regression models for the time to disposition are 
reported in Table 9. Again, the sample size for each model is reduced due to the 
data being restricted to cases that ended in a conviction. There were 3,709 
observations in the drug offenses mode, 3,105 in the person offenses model, and 
4,336 in the property offenses model. A negative and statistically significant 
relationship is seen between typescript status and time to disposition among 
property cases, providing partial support for hypothesis 3. Cases involving types 
were 18% shorter, on average, than cases involving countertypes for property 
offenses, after controlling for other factors. When evaluated at the mean for 
property offenses (168.99 days), this result translates into cases that are roughly 
34 days shorter, on average, compared to countertypical cases. Contrary to 
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hypothesis 3, a positive and significant relationship is seen among drug offenses. 
Cases involving defendants that matched the description of a normal crime 
typescript were 16% longer, on average, compared to cases involving 
countertypes. This finding is likely related to Forst’s (2011) differentiation of 
prosecutor offices that focus on either the quality or quantity of convictions. 
Given that the DANY office decided to prosecute 95.59% of all cases at the 
screening phase, it appears the office has a less selective screening process and is 
therefore more focused on the more convictions than quality convictions. The 
result coupled with Forst’s (2011) work suggest that drug cases brought to the 
DANY office may be particularly plagued with evidentiary issues, and there 
exists an increased incentive to prosecute the cases involving countertypes that 
are seen as weaker more quickly. This could be accomplished through a more 
routine, and possibly more generous, plea-bargaining process compared to when 
perceptually stronger normal crime cases are involved. 
–Insert Table 9 about here– 
An examination of the other independent variables shows that the time 
between case screening and disposition was 19% longer, on average, for black 
defendants compared to white defendants among property offense cases. A 
significant effect is seen for Asian defendants across all offense types. This 
relationship is negative among drug offenses and positive among person and 
property offenses. Drug cases involving Asian defendants were 20% shorter 
compared to cases involving white defendants. The length of cases involving 
Asian defendants was 25% longer for person offenses and 22% longer for 
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property offenses, compared to the length of cases involving white defendants. 
This suggests that stereotypes of Asian criminality might be more salient for drug 
crimes than for person or property crimes, which results in a more expedient 
processing of drug cases involving Asian defendants. The prior conviction 
variable is shown to have a negative and statistically significant effect on time to 
disposition for both drug and person offenses. These results suggest that cases 
involving defendants with prior convictions may be more routinely and efficiently 
processed, resulting in quicker case dispositions. Similarly, a negative and 
statistically significant relationship is seen between pretrial detention and time to 
disposition across all three models. The negative relationship between both prior 
convictions and pretrial detention seen in some of the days to disposition models 
suggest that cases are often disposed of more quickly when the defendant is in a 
position of disadvantage. Finally, cases being represented by public defenders 
were disposed of more quickly, on average and net of other factors, when 
compared to those being represented by private attorneys. This provides support 
for propositions made by the courtroom dynamics perspective, which suggest that 
the prosecutor and public defender work as part of a cohesive unit that considers 
the expeditious disposal of cases to be among the court’s top priorities (Eisenstein 
and Jacob, 1977). 
In addition to Poisson regressions, I performed Levene’s tests for equality 
of variance in order to test the hypothesis that there is a greater variability around 
the median amount of time to disposition for countertype cases. The Levene’s 
tests were evaluated at the median due to skewness in the Days to Disposition 
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variable. Results from the Levene’s tests for equality of variance are reported in 
Table 10. Results from the tests provide strong support for hypothesis 4, which 
stated there will be greater variability in the median time to dispositions for 
countertypes. For all three offense types, the standard deviation around the 
median time to disposition was greater for cases involving countertype 
defendants, rather than types. These results are all statistically significant at the 
0.001 level. These results support the notion that cases that do not match the 
description of a “normal crime” typescript require more individualized treatment 
compared to cases that do fit the “normal crime” typescript, which are processed 
more routinely. 
–Insert Table 10 about here– 
Finally, the results for the logistic regression models for whether a 
defendant received a custodial sentence are reported in Table 11. The data were 
restricted to cases that ended in a conviction. Therefore, the sample size is 
reduced. The typescript coefficient is statistically significant only for drug 
offenses and indicates that the odds of a custodial sentence are 27% lower for 
types than countertypes. Interestingly, each of the typescript characteristics has a 
positive relationship with the custodial sentence outcome individually, but when 
combined their effect is negative. In other words, male, Black, and Hispanic 
defendants charged with a drug offense, as well as those with a criminal history or 
those being represented by a public defender are more likely to receive a custodial 
sentence compared to their respective counterparts, but a defendant that is a Black 
or Hispanic male with a criminal history being represented by a public defender is 
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less likely to receive a custodial sentence compared to countertypes. This 
interaction effect seen in drug cases provides support for hypothesis 5 and the 
overarching assertion that there is a unique effect of fitting the description of a 
“normal crime” typescript. The results from these analyses and their implications 
are discussed in further detail in the following chapter. 
–Insert Table 11 about here– 
Supplementary Analyses  
Additional models were run in order to test the sensitivity of the results for 
the Poisson models on Days to Disposition. These additional analyses were 
deemed necessary due to a substantial number of outliers that could have possibly 
skewed the results of the main analyses. For example, the longest case among 
drug offense cases was 8,236 days, or roughly 22.56 years, long compared to the 
median case length of 147 days. The longest person offense case was 7,025 days, 
or roughly 19.25 years, long compared to the median case length of 162 days for 
person offense cases. Among property offense cases, the longest case was 5,302 
days, or roughly 14.53 years, long compared to the median case length of 117 
days. In order to test the sensitivity of the main Poisson models, which included 
these outliers unaltered, I first reran the Poisson models and Levene’s tests for 
equality of variance with the Days to Disposition variable censored at the 95th 
percentile for each offense type. I then reran the Poisson models and Levene’s 
tests with unknown defense type cases excluded completely. These cases were 
excluded for two reasons. First, they account for a large portion of outliers. 
Second, given the combination of missing defense counsel type and an average 
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case length of 972.81 days, it appears that these cases might have involved 
fugitive defendants, therefore making them unique. 
 The results of the Poisson regressions on the top coded Days to 
Disposition variable are reported in Table 12. As is the case in the main Poisson 
model, typescript status is negatively and significantly related to the time to 
disposition for property offenses, net of other factors. This adds to the support for 
hypothesis 3 among property offenses. Furthermore, the size of the effect is not 
drastically different. The magnitude of the coefficient shrunk from -0.2 to -0.14. 
Whereas this meant that property cases involving types were 18% shorter in the 
original model, in the censored model cases involving types are 13% shorter when 
compared to countertypes. Notably, the coefficient for the typescript variable is 
no longer significant in the drug offenses model after censoring the dependent 
variable. It is possible that the significant result in the original Poisson model is 
driven by outliers, given that it is not significant after censoring the dependent 
variable. Results from the supplementary Levene’s tests for equality of variance 
are presented in table 13. While top coding the data resulted in lesser means for 
all three offense types, the results are substantively unchanged and still provide 
support for hypothesis 4. For all three offense types, cases involving countertypes 
have a larger standard deviation when compared to cases involving types. In 
addition, the test statistics for the Levene’s tests are all statistically significant at 
the 0.001 level, when evaluated at the mean. The results from both the Poisson 
models and Levene’s tests show that the support for hypotheses 3 and 4 seen in 
the original models does not change substantially after censoring the Days to 
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Disposition variable at the 95th percentile for each offense type. However, the 
effect that outliers have on the analyses may not be adequately addressed through 
censoring. Therefore, I ran the Poisson models once again while excluding cases 
with unknown defense counsel type, who predominantly account for unusually 
long cases. 
–Insert Tables 12 and 13 about here– 
 The results for the Poisson regression models on Days to Disposition 
restricted to cases with known defense counsel type are reported in Table 14. 
There are little to no substantive changes in the results when cases with unknown 
defense counsel are removed. After removing these cases, the sample size is 3,619 
for the drug offenses model, 2,992 for person offenses, and 4,190 for property 
offenses. Typescript status is again found to be negatively and significantly 
related to time to disposition. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
unchanged from the censored model, though the standard error increased from 
0.04 to 0.05. In addition, no significant relationship is found between typescript 
status and the time to disposition among drug cases. Given the positive 
relationship between typescript status and time to disposition among drug offense 
cases is only significant in the original model and not significant in the in the two 
supplementary models, it appears that the result in the original model is 
influenced by outliers. The results from the Levene’s tests for equality of variance 
are presented in table 15. Unsurprisingly, excluding cases with unknown defense 
counsel results in reduced mean values for time to disposition compared to those 
of the main analysis. However, the standard deviation for countertypical cases is 
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still greater, and the difference is statistically significant across all three offense 
types. 
–Insert Tables 14 and 15 about here– 
 Overall, the results from these supplementary models testing the 
relationship between typescript status and time to disposition are consistent with 
prior findings. All sets of Poisson regression models investigating the relationship 
between typescript status and time to disposition find a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the two variables among property offense cases. 
These results provide some support for hypothesis 3, which states that cases 
involving types will be disposed of more quickly than cases involving 
countertypes. Consistent support is found for hypothesis 4, which states that there 
will be a greater variability in the time to disposition for countertypical cases. The 
results from all three sets of the Levene’s tests for equality of variance show that 
cases involving countertypes have a greater standard deviation across all three 
offense types. This result was found to be statistically significant in all variations 
of the tests that were performed. 
 In addition to the analyses performed to examine the sensitivity of the 
Days to Disposition models, I ran additional models without controlling for the 
individual typescript characteristics (race, gender, criminal history, and defense 
attorney type). While the main analyses examined whether typescript status had 
an effect in addition to and independent of the individual typescript components, 
this supplementary analysis simply looks at the cumulative effect of possessing all 
of these characteristics. Although the study failed to find support for many of the 
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proposed hypotheses when looking at the independent effect of being a typescript, 
it is still possible that the cumulative effect of being a Black or Hispanic male 
with a criminal history being represented by a public defender is in the directions 
hypothesized for each outcome. 
The results for the models examining the cumulative effect of typescript 
characteristics are reported in Table 16. In line with hypothesis 1, defendants who 
match the description of a “normal crime” typescript are less likely to receive a 
case dismissal at any point for drug and person offenses. This effect is particularly 
pronounced for drug crimes, with types having roughly 25% lower odds of case 
dismissal compared to countertypes. Person offense types have approximately 6% 
lower odds of case dismissal compared to countertypes. In regard to the charge 
reduction outcome, no result was statistically significant. Thus, no support is 
found for hypothesis 2 when looking at the cumulative effect of typescript 
characteristics. Among person and property offense cases, defendants that met the 
description of a type had shorter cases, on average and net of other factors. 
Specifically, cases involving types were approximately 9% shorter among person 
offense cases and 25% shorter among property offense cases. In other words, 
when evaluated at the mean (280 days), person offense cases involving types were 
roughly 25 days shorter compared to cases involving countertypes. When 
evaluated at the mean (544 days), property offense cases involving types are 
roughly 136 days shorter than cases involving countertypes. These relationships 
are in the direction proposed in hypothesis 3. Interestingly and contrary to 
hypothesis 5, the coefficient for typescript status is significant and positive for all 
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three offense types when examining the custodial sentence outcome. These results 
suggest that the combined effect of the individual typescript characteristics results 
in greater odds of imprisonment after conviction. 
–Insert Table 16 about here– 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
 The role that defendant characteristics play in criminal justice decision-
making is complex. Prior research investigating the influence of defendant race, 
gender, socioeconomic status, among other variables, has provided interesting, yet 
mixed findings. When these variables do exert influence on criminal case 
outcomes, it is not always direct (Shermer and Johnson, 2010). Indeed, the effect 
of an individual variable may not be triggered until interacted with other key 
characteristics (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). The notion of individual defendant 
and case characteristics interacting to possibly create disadvantages for groups of 
defendants is of particular interest when studying prosecutorial decision-making, 
given the autonomy and latitude over multiple decisions often enjoyed by 
prosecutors. Currently, extant research has provided encouraging evidence that 
extralegal influence may be conditioned by case characteristics such as crime type 
(Shermer and Johnson, 2010), but has not yet sufficiently examined these nuances 
in prosecutorial decision-making. A complete understanding of the function of 
prosecutorial decision-making requires analyses that examine constellations of 
key case and defendant characteristics across different offense types. 
 The current study investigated the influence of constellations of defendant 
and case characteristics on prosecutorial decision-making. Using a theoretical 
framework that integrated a courtroom dynamics perspective with focal concerns 
and typescripts theories, I examined the interactive effect of defendant race, 
gender, criminal history, and defense counsel on a variety of case processing 
outcomes. The analyses were conducted using data from the District Attorney of 
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New York County (DANY), which were collected over an eighteen-month period 
between 2010 and 2011 (Kutateladze and Andiloro, 2014). The constellations of 
defendant and case characteristics were used to create and test the influence of 
“normal crime” typescripts on key case processing stages for three felony offense 
categories: drug, person, and property offenses. Sudnow (1964) argues that 
definition of “normal crimes” will be based on the pool of defendants that are 
typically processed in a given jurisdiction. Therefore, the “normal crime” 
typescripts used for the current study were defined by the most common 
combinations of defendant race, gender, criminal history, and defense counsel 
found in the DANY data for each of the three offense categories. The types of 
defendants processed for each offense type were similar, resulting in a typescript 
defined as a Black or Hispanic male with a criminal history represented by a 
public defender for all three crime categories. Logistic and Poisson regression 
models were used to examine the effect of typescript status on case dismissal, 
charge reduction in plea deals, the time elapsed before a case was disposed, and 
whether the defendant received a custodial sentence. Support for the hypotheses is 
summarized in Table 17. Overall, the study found mixed results in regard to the 
hypotheses proposed. 
–Insert Table 17 about here– 
 The first hypothesis proposed that cases matching the description of a 
“normal crime” typescript would be less likely to have their cases dismissed at 
any point when compared to cases that do not meet this description. The logistic 
regression models returned results that provide support for this hypothesis, but 
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only for one offense type. A negative and statistically significant relationship 
between typescript status and the probability of a case being dismissed was found 
for person offense types. Therefore, it appears that there is something unique 
about person offenses that results in countertypical cases having lesser odds of 
dismissal. It is possible that the more serious nature of person offenses conveys to 
prosecutors a higher probability of guilt when a defendant matches the description 
of a type. Indeed, Steffensmeier and colleagues (1998) argue that the 
blameworthiness focal concern is tied to the seriousness of the offense and the 
harm caused. Because they usually involve physical harm to other individuals, 
person offenses are usually seen as more serious when compared to other offense 
types such as drug and property offenses. In addition, concerns about the 
protection of the community may make prosecutors more reluctant to dismiss 
“normal crime” cases when the defendant is charged with a person offense. Given 
the more serious nature of person offenses, prosecutors may be reluctant to 
dismiss defendants that meet the description of a typical offender for person 
offenses and possibly release a dangerous, defendant back into society. 
Given that statistical significance is largely influenced by sample size 
(Amrhein, Greenland, and McShane, 2019), a larger sample size may be 
necessary to detect statistically significant differences between types and 
countertypes. This makes intuitive sense when evaluating these models because 
the difference between types and countertypes can be subtle in the DANY system. 
Most defendants classified as countertypes in the three DANY samples still 
possess some of the same characteristics as those classified as types, but not all. 
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Testing this hypothesis on a more diverse sample may prove useful and 
informative. 
 The second hypothesis posited that cases matching the description of a 
“normal crime” typescript would be more likely to receive a charge reduction 
compared to countertypical cases. The relationship between typescript status and 
charge reduction was positive for property offense cases, as hypothesized, yet 
negative for drug and person offense cases. None of the coefficients for the 
typescript variable were statistically significant at any level. Therefore, I find no 
support for this hypothesis. The hypothesis was based on the notion that 
standardized plea deals are constructed between the prosecutor and public 
defender for normal crimes (Sudnow, 1964). It was proposed that plea deals 
would be more likely in typical cases because of this standardization of the plea 
deal process, but less likely for countertypical case because routines had not been 
established for plea negotiations involving such cases. It is important to exercise 
caution when interpreting these results, however. It is possible that types are no 
more likely to receive a charge reduction as part of a plea deal, but the reduction 
offered to types may be more similar to one another than those offered to 
countertypes. For example, Sudnow (1964) argues that the typical burglary charge 
is often reduced to petty theft in the course of plea bargaining. This specific type 
of reduction may be common for types, but not countertypes. Cases involving 
countertypes may be more likely to be reduced to a wider variety of lesser 
charges. Future research should research the possibility that the charge reductions 
given in plea deals are different for types and countertypes, on average. 
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 The third hypothesis stated that the time elapsed between the filing of 
criminal charges and case disposition would be shorter for cases that match the 
description of a “normal crime” typescript compared to those that didn’t. This 
hypothesis was informed by the theoretical supposition that decision-making in 
cases involving types would be routine due to their commonality, while cases 
involving countertypes would require additional scrutiny. This additional scrutiny 
would result in a longer time to process the case. The Poisson regression models 
found support for this hypothesis in regard to property offenses only. Cases 
involving defendants who met the description of a normal crime typescript were 
18% shorter, on average and net of other factors, than cases involving countertype 
defendants. This result was found to be robust, as the substantive result was 
unchanged in supplementary analyses that examined the influence of outliers. 
Among drug offenses, cases involving types were found to be 16% longer than 
cases involving countertype, which runs counter to the hypothesis. However, the 
statistical significance of this positive relationship was sensitive to outliers in the 
supplementary analyses and should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
 The fourth hypothesis was derived using the same logic used to posit the 
third hypothesis and stated that there would be a greater variability in the average 
time between screening and disposition for cases that do not match the description 
of a “normal crime typescript.” I argued that if typescript cases were processed 
more routinely, this would result in more uniformity in the length of normal crime 
cases. Given the similarities of types, it is logical to argue that the speed at which 
they are processed would be more similar compared to cases involving 
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countertypes. Standard deviation was used as the metric for the variability in time 
between case screening and disposition. In order to test this hypothesis, Levene’s 
tests for the equality of variance were run. The results from these tests provided 
strong support for hypothesis 4. The standard deviation was larger for cases 
involving countertypes and significantly different from that of types across all 
three offense types. Supplementary analyses using different variations of the 
dependent variable were run to test the sensitivity of the results. The conclusions 
were the same when the Days to Disposition was censored at the 95th percentile, 
as well as when cases with unknown defense counsel were excluded. The results 
provide evidence that cases matching the “normal crime” typescript are processed 
more uniformly when compared to countertypical cases. 
 The fifth and final hypothesis stated that for all cases that ended in a 
conviction, cases that match the description of a “normal crime” typescript would 
be less likely to receive a custodial sentence when compared to cases that did not. 
Harris and Hill (1986) argued that the rarity of countertypes increases with each 
additional node of status processing decisions. This continually increasing rarity 
signals to decision-makers that there is something unique, and potentially 
dangerous, about these “late node countertypes.” These individuals will therefore 
be subject to harsher treatment. Applied to the current study, late node 
countertypes were hypothesized to receive harsher penalties at sentencing in the 
form of a higher likelihood of receiving a custodial sentence. The results from the 
logistic regression models testing this hypothesis returned mixed results. As 
hypothesized, a negative relationship between typescript status and custodial 
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sentence was reported for drug offenses. The models failed to find a statistically 
significant relationship for person and property offenses. However, the lack of 
statistical significance for the other two models could again be the result of 
decreased sample size due to the restriction to cases that ended in a conviction. 
That being said, the results do provide some support for the notion that late node 
countertypes are subject to harsher penalties for drug offenses. The results suggest 
that this is not the case for person or property offenses, signaling the possibility of 
more variation in case processing decisions across different offense types. Further 
investigation is needed to determine the veracity of this claim, however. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
This study has a number of limitations. First, its focus on a single 
jurisdiction limits its generalizability. Although the data provide important 
information on a large number of cases across multiple offense types, the results 
are not generalizable to other jurisdictions or prosecution country-wide. 
Prosecutor offices are subject to local norms and procedures, and case processing 
patterns are likely to vary to a certain degree from office to office (Sudnow, 1965; 
Frederick and Stemen, 2012). This study argues that prosecutor offices at the 
aggregate process normal crime typescripts in a similar manner, but what 
constitutes a normal crime may vary from office to office based on the people that 
tend to be processed by the specific office. Therefore, the generalizability of the 
results could be increased by comparing case processing outcomes for multiple 
jurisdictions. Such a comparative analysis is out of the scope of the current study 
but is a possible avenue for future research.  
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Furthermore, while comparisons between different bureaus within the 
DANY office could have theoretically provided for an informative analysis for 
much the same reasons as a multi-jurisdictional analysis, there was not enough 
variation across bureaus to warrant such an analysis. For inference, the DANY 
office is comprised of the Trial Division, Investigation Division, and Appeals 
Bureau. Prosecutors in the Trial Division primarily focus on prosecuting 
misdemeanor and felony crimes and contains six separate trial bureaus and 
additional specialized bureaus and units. The Investigation Division’s primary 
focus is on white-collar and organized-crime cases. The Appeals Bureau provide 
written and oral analyses of legal and factual issues to ensure previous DANY 
prosecutions are upheld in New York’s appellate and all federal courts 
(Kutateladze and Andiloro, 2014). Roughly 97% of the cases included in this 
study were prosecuted by the six trial bureaus, whose stated purpose and function 
do not differ. In addition, there was little to no difference in the demographics of 
defendants prosecuted across the six trial bureaus. The most common 
combination of typescript characteristics for each trial bureau was again a Black 
or Hispanic male with a criminal history being represented by a public defender. 
 Second, this study was limited by a lack of variability in the most common 
defendant characteristics for each of the three offense types tested. While this 
does not invalidate the analyses and their results, differing descriptions for 
“normal crime” typescripts across offenses would have provided for a more 
rigorous test of the theoretical framework. For example, if the description of the 
typescript for Crime A was a White female with no criminal history being 
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represented by a public defender and the description of the typescript for Crime B 
was a Black male with a criminal history being represented by a public defender, 
but the relationships between typescript status and the outcome variables were 
largely the same, this would provide stronger evidence for the theoretical 
argument. Instead, the description of a type for drug, person, and property 
offenses is a Black or Hispanic male with a criminal history being represented by 
a public defender. Comparisons of differing typescripts is a possible direction for 
future research, however. An analysis of two jurisdictions in which the 
description of a typescript for a given offense type is unique for each jurisdiction 
would provide an especially informative test of the theoretical arguments put forth 
in this study. 
Third, this study likely suffers from omitted variable bias due to the lack 
of a variable measuring evidentiary strength. This is not an issue unique to this 
study, as information on the strength of evidence in a given case is difficult to 
measure and rarely recorded (Shermer and Johnson, 2010). Despite this being a 
common issue in case processing studies, it nonetheless prevents a complete 
understanding of prosecutorial decision-making across the outcomes analyzed in 
this study. This is an important direction for future research on case processing 
and prosecutorial decision-making. As more partnerships between researchers and 
prosecutor offices are formed, methods for measuring and evaluating evidentiary 
strength should be developed so that future research does not suffer from the same 
omitted variable bias. 
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Fourth, while the DANY dataset provides information on the criminal 
history of defendants in the form of prior arrest and prior conviction counts, the 
nature of these prior contacts with the criminal justice system are unknown. This 
is particularly problematic for this study because when judging the typicality of a 
given case, prosecutors most likely consider not only whether a defendant has a 
criminal history, but also the nature of these prior offenses. If a defendant charged 
with burglary has three prior convictions: two for petty theft and one for burglary, 
he or she will be viewed as more typical. However, if these prior convictions were 
assault and possession of cocaine, it is unlikely that the defendant will be seen as 
a typical burglary defendant. While this assumption is viewed as likely, it is 
certainly not ironclad. It is also possible that prior criminality is all that matters to 
prosecutors when evaluating the typicality of a case, and the nature and type of 
these prior offenses has no additional influence on prosecutorial decision-making. 
Regardless, whether the nature of a defendant’s criminal record does indeed 
influence prosecutorial decision-making cannot be known without information on 
the offenses contained in a defendant’s prior record. 
Fifth, the data do not provide information that would allow for the 
separation of drug possession offenses from drug distribution offenses.12 The 
difference between drug possession and drug distribution is likely significant in 
the eyes of prosecutors, and there are likely differences in how these two types of 
cases are processed. In a study that collected interview data from judges, 
 
12 Given that this analysis was restricted to felony cases, the majority of drug cases analyzed are 
likely to be distribution charges. However, New York State Criminal Law includes some drug use 
and possession crimes as felonies (e.g. New York Penal Law §220.55, “Criminally using drug 
paraphernalia in the first degree” is categorized as a D Felony). 
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prosecutors, and defense attorneys Engen and colleagues (1999) found that drug 
delivery convictions were more often associated with images of threat when 
compared to drug possession convictions. In a subsequent analysis, Engen and 
colleagues (2005) found that individuals charged with drug distribution charges 
received harsher outcomes than those charged with possession offenses, 
particularly for White defendants. These two studies together provide evidence 
for the importance of making a distinction between drug possession and 
distribution charges. 
Sixth, the data do not provide information on victim characteristics, which 
would undoubtedly increase the precision of the theoretical tests. Similar to how 
the effect of being a type is often conditional on the offense committed, it is 
possible that certain effects of being a type are condition on whether a victim was 
present, as well as characteristics of the victim. Certain racial and gender 
stereotypes are intrinsically tied to the offender-victim dyad. For example, 
research on the death penalty has consistently shown that the probability of a 
defendant receiving the death penalty is greatest when the defendant is black, and 
the victim is white (Paternoster, 1984; Paternoster and Brame, 2008). It is 
plausible that differential treatment of a defendants labeled as a type is greatest 
when the charged offense involved a victim whose typescript does not normally 
involve victimization, such as a high socioeconomic status white woman. 
Lastly, the 1,593 cases for which the type of defense counsel is unknown 
limits the analyses for multiple reasons. First, missing information can bias 
estimates when it is not missing at random or properly taken into account 
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(Graham, 2009). In regard to the missing values for defense counsel, descriptive 
analyses discovered that these cases are overwhelmingly older cases that ended in 
a dismissal. Controlling for these missing defense cases helps to produce unbiased 
estimates, preventing these missing values from creating serious model 
specification issues. However, there is still no information as to why these cases 
are missing the information or why they tend to have been in the DANY system 
for so long. A lack of knowledge as to the uniqueness of these cases undoubtedly 
limits our understanding of the function of the DANY office and the cases that are 
processed within it. 
Conclusion 
 
 This study adds to the literature on prosecutorial decision-making and case 
processing by integrating three theoretical perspectives into a singular framework 
with the ability to explain complexities in prosecutorial decision-making across 
multiple offenses and decision points. While the results from the analyses 
performed are mixed, there is enough evidence in support of the hypotheses to 
warrant future research. For example, in a result that provides support for the 
notion that concerns and evaluations of blameworthiness and dangerousness are 
tied to the severity of the offense (Steffensmeier et al., 1998), person offense 
cases that matched the description of a “normal crime” typescript were less likely 
to be dismissed at any point after case screening when compared to cases that did 
not. In support of the notion that typical cases are processed more routinely, 
derived from the courtroom workgroup perspective, property cases involving 
types were found to be shorter, on average, compared to cases involving 
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countertypical defendants. Further support for the arguments of routinization was 
provided by the result that among cases that ended in a conviction, those that met 
the description of a “normal crime” typescript were less likely to end in a 
custodial sentence than countertypical cases for drug offenses. Moreover, the 
standard deviation for countertypical cases was larger and significantly different 
from that of types for all three offense categories. This supports the hypothesis 
that there is more variation in the time between screening and disposition for 
countertypical cases, due to a lack of experience and standardization of their 
processing.  
The issue of statistical insignificance in many of the models reported in 
this study may be more a question of statistical power than theoretical validity. 
This is of particular concern when considering the homogeneity of defendants in 
the DANY dataset. While the constellation constructed to define the “normal 
crime” typescripts differentiates types from countertypes, many countertypes still 
possess some of the same characteristics as types. Future research applying this 
theoretical framework to a more diverse sample of defendants, as well as 
analyzing patterns for partial types (those who possess some, but not all typescript 
characteristics) would provide an improved method of testing its assumptions. 
Such analyses were performed by Engen and colleagues (2005) who examined the 
role of typescript status in sentencing decisions and found that defendants that 
possessed different combinations of typescript characteristics experienced 
different sentencing outcomes. 
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This study provides a test of a theoretical framework that is flexible 
enough to test the relationships between typescript status and case processing 
outcomes across different crimes and jurisdictions, regardless of what constitutes 
the actual description of a given typescript. The results suggest that certain case 
processing outcomes are different, on average and net of other factors, for 
typescripts compared to countertypes, though not always as originally 
hypothesized. The mixed nature of the results fits in with the overall pattern of 
previous research examining prosecution in which some studies have not found 
extralegal influence on decision-making (Bishop and Frazier, 1984; Albonetti, 
1992; Spears and Spohn, 1997; Holleran et al., 2010), while others have indeed 
found direct effects of factors such as defendant race and gender (Spohn et 
al.,1987; Albonetti and Hepburn, 1996; Kutateladze et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
differing patterns across offense types is in line with the conclusion made by 
Shermer and Johnson (2010) that suggests that disadvantages created by 
defendant race and gender may be present in some offense types, but not others. 
In other words, the salience of certain stereotypes may depend on the charged 
offense. Such unequal effects of stereotypes is a key component of the theoretical 
framework put forth in this study and provides support for the argument that 
prosecutorial decision-making is not uniform across offense types, nor decision 
points. 
In sum, though not all hypotheses were supported by the results, enough 
evidence in support of the theoretical framework exists to encourage future tests. 
Moreover, the identification of methodological limitations in the current study 
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helps to make clearer the path towards future investigations. If data issues limiting 
this analysis can be addressed in future studies, a more complete evaluation of the 
theoretical framework and understanding of prosecutorial decision-making can be 
achieved. The results from this study lend credence to the assertion that 
prosecutorial decision-making is complex, and disadvantages felt by defendants 
can vary across both decision points and offense types. Prosecutors are arguably 
the most consequential actors in the criminal justice system, and it is imperative 
that researchers build a better understanding of their decision-making. This study 
adds to that understanding and identifies important directions for the 






Table 1. Distribution of Typescript Characteristics 






Characteristics N % N % N % N % 
 
Race 
        
  White 2,174 11.63 518 9.65 569 8.61 1.087 16.18 
  Black 9,408 50.33 2,584 48.16 3,555 53.82 3,269 48.65 
  Hispanic 6,586 35.24 2,220 41.37 2,307 34.93 2,059 30.64 
  Asian 523 2.8 44 0.82 174 2.63 305 4.54 
 
Gender                
  Male 15,257 81.63 4,703 87.64 5,553 84.07 5,001 74.42 
  Female 3,434 18.37 663 12.36 1,052 15.93 1,719 25.58 
 
Criminal History                
  Yes 8,726 46.69 3,949 73.59 3,664 55.47 3,568 53.10 
  No 9,965 53.31 1,417 26.41 2,941 44.53 3,152 46.90 
 
Defense Counsel                
  Private 1,440 7.7 430 8.01 436 6.6 574 8.54 
  Public 15,658 83.77 4,541 84.63 5,676 85.93 5,441 80.97 
  Unknown 1,593 8.52 395 7.36 493 7.46 705 10.49 
         
Typescript         
  Minority Male   
  w/ Criminal   
  History and  
  Public Defender 
8,099 43.33% 2,954 55.05% 2,832 42.88% 2,313 34.42 
         
           
Total 18,691  5,366   6,605  6,720  
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Table 2. Frequency of Typescript Variations 






N % N % N % N % 
 
Typescript         
  Black or Hispanic Male with Criminal History Represented  
  by a Public Defender 
8,099 43.33% 2,954 55.05% 2,832 42.88% 2,313 34.42 
 
Non-Typescript Combinations 
        
  Black or Hispanic Male without a Criminal History  
  Represented by a Public Defender 
3,155 16.88% 641 11.95% 1,490 22.56% 1,024 15.24% 
  Black male with a criminal history and public defender 5,021 26.86% 1,764 32.87% 1,802 27.28% 1,455 21.65% 
  Hispanic male with a criminal history and public defender 3,078 16.47% 1,190 22.18% 1,030 15.59% 858 12.77% 
  White male with a criminal history and public defender 629 3.37% 196 3.65% 127 1.92% 306 4.55% 
 
Alternative Criminal History Measures 
        
  Black or Hispanic Male with one or more arrests represented 
  by a public defender 
7,275 38.92% 2,628 51.01% 2,560 38.76% 2,087 31.06% 
  Black or Hispanic Male with one or more convictions  
  represented by a public defender 
6,549 35.04% 2,561 47.73% 2,076 31.43% 1,912 28.45% 
         
















Table 3. Correlation Table Between Typescripts and Dependent Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Case Dismissal 1.00       
2. Charge Reduction -0.50 1.00      
3. Custodial Sentence -0.58 0.19 1     
4. Days to Disposition 0.31 -0.15 -0.18 1    
5. Drug Offender Type -0.14 0.02 0.19 -0.11 1   
6. Person Offender Type 0.04 -0.00 0.06 -0.11 -0.18 1  
7. Property Offender Type -0.12 0.04 0.20 -0.11 -0.16 -0.16 1 
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix Between Typescripts and Independent Variables   
1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 
1. Drug Offender Type 1.00         
2. Person Offender Type -0.18 1.00        
3. Property Offender Type -0.16 -0.16 1.00       
4. Criminal History 0.36 0.35 0.31 1.00      
5. Public Defender 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.21 1.00     
7. Total Charges -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02 1.00    
8. Total Counts -0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.53 1.00   
9. Pretrial Detention 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.41 0.17 0.13 0.06 1.00  
10. Age 0.13 -0.11 0.13 0.18 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.13 1.00 
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Table 5. Variation Inflation Factors 
Variable VIFs 
Drug Offense Type 1.82 
Person Offense Type 1.82 
Property Offense Type 1.66 
Criminal History 2.25 
Public Defender 2.13 
Missing Defense Counsel 1.93 
Total Charges 1.41 
Total Counts 1.39 
Pretrial Detention 1.25 
Age 1.08 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables by Offense Type 
 %/Mean (SD) 
Variables All Cases Drug Offenses Person Offenses Property Offenses 
Dependent Variables         
   Case Dismissed 37%  29%  49%  33%  
   Charge Reduction 65%  56%  71%  67%  
   Custodial Sentence 58%  64%  61%  51%  
   Days to Disposition13 196.82 (324.92) 211.49 (403.00) 216.76 (337.22) 168.99 (223.52) 
Independent Variables        
   Type 43%  55%  43%  34%  
Typescript Characteristics        
   Male 82%  88%  84%  74%  
   White 12%  10%  9%  16%  
   Black 50%  48%  54%  49%  
   Hispanic 35%  41%  35%  31%  
   Asian 3%  1%  3%  5%  
   Prior Arrest(s) 53%  65%  50%  48%  
   Prior Conviction(s) 47%  62%  40%  41%  
   Public Defender 84%  85%  86%  81%  
   Private Counsel 8%  8%  7%  9%  
   Missing Counsel 9%  7%  7%  10%  
Charging Characteristics        
   Number of Charges 2.11 (1.09) 2.02 (1.03) 2.18 (1.13) 2.12 (1.09) 
   Number of Counts 2.48 (2.82) 2.17 (2.25) 2.35 (1.51) 2.86 (3.95) 
Statutory Severity        
   Class A Felony 2%  6%  0%  0%  
   Class B Felony 28%  73%  18%  2%  
   Class C Felony 17%  4%  31%  12%  
 
13 The Mean time to disposition is reported for cases that ended in a conviction only, as those are the cases being examined for this outcome. 
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   Class D Felony 35%  16%  48%  36%  
   Class E Felony 19%  0%  3%  50%  
Contextual Variables        
   Pretrial Detention 55%  67%  56%  47%  
Neighborhood of Arrest         
   Upper West/East Side 11%  8%  14%  10%  
   Harlem 39%  61%  41%  19%  
   MTDT-West 39%  23%  36%  56%  
   MTDT-East 7%  6%  6%  8%  
   Outside Manhattan 4%  1%  3%  8%  
Demographic Characteristics        






Table 7. Logistic Regressions of Decision to Dismiss at Any Point 
  Drug Offenses Person Offenses Property Offenses 
VARIABLES Logit Robust SE Odds Logit Robust SE Odds Logit Robust SE Odds 
Type -0.06 (0.08) 0.941 -0.15* (0.07) 0.859* -0.13 (0.19) 0.878 
Male -0.12 (0.08) 0.890 0.08 (0.08) 1.083 0.14* (0.07) 1.145* 
Black 0.24 (0.24) 1.266 0.18 (0.11) 1.200 0.26*** (0.08) 1.300*** 
Hispanic 0.29* (0.14) 1.337* 0.23* (0.10) 1.258* 0.16** (0.05) 1.169** 
Asian -0.06 (0.51) 0.940 0.16 (0.23) 1.174 0.13 (0.10) 1.141 
Prior Arrest -0.13** (0.05) 0.877** 0.07 (0.06) 1.070 0.14 (0.10) 1.153 
Prior Conviction -0.21*** (0.04) 0.809*** -0.01 (0.05) 0.990 -0.27*** (0.08) 0.764*** 
Public Defender -0.32 (0.18) 0.726 -0.01 (0.09) 0.988 -0.23 (0.26) 0.793 
Missing Counsel 1.80*** (0.23) 6.077*** 1.20*** (0.17) 3.318*** 1.91*** (0.27) 6.768*** 
Number of Charges 0.00 (0.03) 1.002 -0.12*** (0.02) 0.887*** -0.18*** (0.04) 0.835*** 
Number of Counts -0.09* (0.04) 0.913* -0.08*** (0.02) 0.924*** -0.02* (0.01) 0.981* 
Class A -0.13 (0.13) 0.877 - - - - - - 
Class B -0.16** (0.06) 0.852** -0.00 (0.12) 1.000 -0.32 (0.37) 0.729 
Class C -0.07 (0.14) 0.933 0.09 (0.09) 1.099 -0.13 (0.12) 0.875 
Class E - - - 0.08 (0.05) 1.080 0.22** (0.07) 1.250** 
Pretrial Detention -0.96*** (0.09) 0.385*** -1.21*** (0.02) 0.298*** -0.85*** (0.18) 0.428*** 
Harlem 0.12*** (0.01) 1.130*** 0.26*** (0.00) 1.301*** 0.49*** (0.02) 1.626*** 
MTDT-West -0.06 (0.05) 0.946 -0.27*** (0.01) 0.765*** -0.16*** (0.02) 0.849*** 
MTDT-East -0.01 (0.07) 0.990 -0.32*** (0.01) 0.728*** 0.07*** (0.02) 1.076*** 
Outside Manhattan -0.66*** (0.08) 0.516*** -0.59*** (0.02) 0.553*** -0.46*** (0.02) 0.631*** 
Age -0.00 (0.00) 0.998 -0.00 (0.00) 1.000 -0.01** (0.00) 0.994** 
Constant 0.28 (0.39) 1.318 0.84*** (0.10) 2.306*** -0.04 (0.29) 0.966 
          
N 5,358    6,602    6,712    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05         
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Table 8. Logistic Regressions of Charge Reduction Outcome 
  Drug Offenses Person Offenses Property Offenses 
VARIABLES Logit Robust SE Odds Logit Robust SE Odds Logit Robust SE Odds 
Type -0.19 (0.31) 0.826 -0.09 (0.08) 0.917 0.05 (0.20) 1.046 
Male -0.10 (0.14) 0.901 -0.40** (0.12) 0.672** 0.02 (0.14) 1.020 
Black 0.06 (0.10) 1.065 0.01 (0.14) 1.007 0.03 (0.12) 1.035 
Hispanic -0.06 (0.15) 0.942 0.00 (0.15) 1.004 -0.07 (0.09) 0.935 
Asian -0.04 (0.50) 0.957 0.68*** (0.17) 1.982*** 0.40 (0.27) 1.496 
Prior Arrest -0.07 (0.12) 0.936 -0.01 (0.23) 0.992 -0.14 (0.14) 0.871 
Prior Conviction 0.14 (0.20) 1.146 0.51*** (0.15) 1.659*** -0.05 (0.09) 0.954 
Public Defender 0.22 (0.17) 1.244 -0.26 (0.16) 0.768 0.05 (0.09) 1.048 
Missing Counsel 0.59** (0.20) 1.807** -0.59 (0.37) 0.554 -0.56*** (0.14) 0.572*** 
Number of Charges -0.04*** (0.01) 0.957*** 0.06 (0.05) 1.060 -0.06 (0.03) 0.942 
Number of Counts -0.01 (0.02) 0.994 -0.05 (0.06) 0.954 -0.06*** (0.01) 0.940*** 
Class A 0.23*** (0.05) 1.263*** - - - - - - 
Class B -0.39*** (0.11) 0.680*** -0.02 (0.23) 0.984 0.56 (0.34) 1.758 
Class C 0.07 (0.07) 1.075 0.16 (0.33) 1.173 0.39* (0.19) 1.477* 
Class E -  - -0.26* (0.12) 0.775* 0.13 (0.11) 1.144 
Pretrial Detention -0.67*** (0.03) 0.510*** -0.76*** (0.14) 0.468*** -1.34*** (0.06) 0.262*** 
Harlem 0.07*** (0.01) 1.072*** -0.05** (0.02) 0.951** 0.14*** (0.03) 1.153*** 
MTDT-West 0.21*** (0.02) 1.238*** -0.12 (0.06) 0.891 -0.12*** (0.01) 0.890*** 
MTDT-East -0.05 (0.03) 0.953 0.61*** (0.04) 1.841*** -0.06** (0.02) 0.941** 
Outside Manhattan -0.30*** (0.05) 0.739*** -0.54*** (0.06) 0.580*** 0.00 (0.03) 1.001 
Age 0.01*** (0.00) 1.012*** 0.04*** (0.01) 1.039*** 0.01*** (0.00) 1.006*** 
Constant 0.61 (0.31) 1.848 0.99*** (0.26) 2.702*** 1.70*** (0.24) 5.474*** 
          
N    3,634    2,955    4,258 





Table 9. Poisson Regressions for Days to Disposition 
  Drug Offenses Person Offenses Property Offenses 
VARIABLES 𝜷 Robust SE IRR 𝜷 Robust SE IRR 𝜷 Robust SE IRR 
Type 0.15* (0.06) 1.16* 0.04 (0.05) 1.04 -0.20** (0.07) 0.82** 
Male -0.09 (0.17) 0.91 0.09 (0.05) 1.09 -0.08 (0.06) 0.92 
Black -0.10 (0.13) 0.91 -0.01 (0.14) 0.99 0.18** (0.06) 1.19** 
Hispanic 0.06 (0.13) 1.07 0.09 (0.12) 1.10 0.16** (0.06) 1.17** 
Asian -0.23* (0.09) 0.80* 0.23* (0.09) 1.25* 0.20* (0.09) 1.22* 
Prior Arrest -0.03 (0.06) 0.97 -0.10 (0.05) 0.91 -0.06 (0.03) 0.94 
Prior Conviction -0.19*** (0.04) 0.83*** -0.12* (0.05) 0.89* -0.08 (0.07) 0.93 
Public Defender -0.27*** (0.02) 0.76*** -0.18*** (0.04) 0.84*** -0.24*** (0.02) 0.79*** 
Missing Counsel 2.09*** (0.07) 8.10*** 1.38*** (0.16) 3.96*** 0.97*** (0.16) 2.64*** 
Number of Charges -0.03 (0.04) 0.97 0.05 (0.04) 1.05 0.01 (0.02) 1.01 
Number of Counts 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 0.01 (0.02) 1.01 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 
Class A 0.49*** (0.09) 1.63*** - - - - - - 
Class B 0.23* (0.10) 1.26* 0.56*** (0.08) 1.75*** 0.33*** (0.07) 1.39*** 
Class C 0.20* (0.10) 1.22* 0.24*** (0.05) 1.27*** 0.08 (0.05) 1.09 
Class E - - - -0.18* (0.08) 0.84* -0.21*** (0.04) 0.81*** 
Pretrial Detention -0.22*** (0.05) 0.80*** -0.14*** (0.03) 0.87*** -0.17** (0.06) 0.84** 
Harlem -0.05*** (0.01) 0.95*** -0.09*** (0.01) 0.92*** -0.03** (0.01) 0.98** 
MTDT-West -0.04 (0.03) 0.96 -0.05** (0.02) 0.95** -0.04*** (0.01) 0.96*** 
MTDT-East 0.08 (0.04) 1.08 -0.05* (0.02) 0.95* 0.04*** (0.01) 1.04*** 
Outside Manhattan -1.50*** (0.09) 0.22*** -0.04 (0.03) 0.96 -0.21*** (0.05) 0.81*** 
Age -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 
Constant 5.76*** (0.39) 318.86*** 5.15*** (0.17) 172.11*** 5.57*** (0.09) 262.13*** 
          
N    3,709    3,105    4,336 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05        
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Table 10. Levene’s Tests for Equality of Variance 
 Drug Offenses Person Offenses Property Offenses 
Typescript Status Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N 
Countertype 280.83 613.82*** 1,433 257.49 447.98*** 1,551 202.63 262.54*** 2,583 
Type 167.87 150.78*** 2,278 176.11 153.87*** 1,554 121.90 134.74*** 1,753 
          
N   3,711   3,105   4,336 





Table 11. Logistic Regressions for Custodial Sentence Outcome 
  Drug Offenses Person Offenses Property Offenses 
VARIABLES Logit Robust SE Odds Logit Robust SE Odds Logit Robust SE Odds 
Type -0.31* (0.13) 0.73* -0.04 (0.16) 0.96 0.04 (0.18) 1.05 
Male 0.66*** (0.14) 1.93*** 0.45*** (0.12) 1.57*** 0.87*** (0.06) 2.38*** 
Black 0.81*** (0.17) 2.25*** 0.38* (0.19) 1.46* 0.18 (0.10) 1.19 
Hispanic 0.64* (0.26) 1.90* 0.37** (0.12) 1.45** 0.12 (0.11) 1.13 
Asian 0.30 (0.93) 1.35 0.20 (0.16) 1.22 -0.60** (0.21) 0.55** 
Prior Arrest 0.25*** (0.07) 1.29*** 0.48** (0.17) 1.61** 0.59*** (0.06) 1.81*** 
Prior Conviction 0.91*** (0.16) 2.47*** 0.89*** (0.06) 2.44*** 0.98*** (0.10) 2.67*** 
Public Defender 0.34 (0.19) 1.41 0.25 (0.27) 1.28 0.24 (0.15) 1.27 
Missing Counsel -0.16 (0.35) 0.85 0.59 (0.43) 1.80 -0.15 (0.34) 0.86 
Number of Charges -0.27*** (0.07) 0.76*** 0.06 (0.12) 1.06 0.09* (0.04) 1.10* 
Number of Counts 0.19*** (0.05) 1.21*** 0.03 (0.06) 1.03 -0.00 (0.01) 1.00 
Class A 1.04** (0.34) 2.82** - - - - - - 
Class B 0.25** (0.08) 1.29** 1.17*** (0.14) 3.21*** 0.35*** (0.10) 1.42*** 
Class C -0.25 (0.30) 0.78 0.48*** (0.07) 1.61*** 0.16 (0.10) 1.18 
Class E - - - -0.05 (0.23) 0.95 -0.19*** (0.02) 0.83*** 
Pretrial Detention 1.88*** (0.07) 6.54*** 1.94*** (0.15) 6.99*** 2.39*** (0.04) 10.93*** 
Harlem 0.25*** (0.01) 1.29*** 0.35*** (0.01) 1.42*** -0.09*** (0.01) 0.92*** 
MTDT-West 0.31*** (0.03) 1.36*** 0.39*** (0.02) 1.48*** -0.01 (0.03) 0.99 
MTDT-East 0.25*** (0.03) 1.28*** 0.29*** (0.01) 1.34*** -0.21*** (0.02) 0.81*** 
Outside Manhattan 0.30** (0.10) 1.36** 0.39*** (0.01) 1.48*** 0.13*** (0.03) 1.13*** 
Age 0.01 (0.00) 1.01 0.03** (0.01) 1.03** 0.03*** (0.00) 1.03*** 
Constant -3.49*** (0.25) 0.03*** -4.23*** (0.62) 0.01*** -4.12*** (0.22) 0.02*** 
          
N    3,497    3,043    4,238 
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Table 12. Poisson Regressions for Days to Disposition (Top Coded at 95th Percentile) 
  Drug Offenses Person Offenses Property Offenses 
VARIABLES 𝜷 Robust SE IRR 𝜷 Robust SE IRR 𝜷 Robust SE IRR 
Type 0.02 (0.07) 1.02 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 -0.14*** (0.04) 0.87*** 
Male 0.02 (0.05) 1.02 0.05 (0.07) 1.05 -0.08*** (0.02) 0.92*** 
Black -0.02 (0.02) 0.98 -0.02 (0.06) 0.98 0.17*** (0.02) 1.19*** 
Hispanic 0.04** (0.01) 1.04** 0.02 (0.04) 1.02 0.13*** (0.03) 1.13*** 
Asian -0.14* (0.06) 0.87* 0.11* (0.05) 1.12* 0.17** (0.06) 1.18** 
Prior Arrest -0.02 (0.02) 0.98 -0.05** (0.01) 0.95** -0.05** (0.02) 0.95** 
Prior Conviction -0.06 (0.04) 0.94 -0.07** (0.02) 0.93** -0.12* (0.05) 0.89* 
Public Defender -0.20** (0.06) 0.82** -0.18*** (0.04) 0.83*** -0.20*** (0.02) 0.82*** 
Missing Counsel 0.65*** (0.08) 1.92*** 0.25*** (0.07) 1.28*** 0.22* (0.09) 1.24* 
Number of Charges 0.05 (0.03) 1.05 0.03 (0.02) 1.03 0.02 (0.01) 1.02 
Number of Counts -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 0.01** (0.00) 1.01** 
Class A 0.51*** (0.04) 1.67*** - - - - - - 
Class B 0.28*** (0.02) 1.32*** 0.54*** (0.05) 1.72*** 0.36*** (0.10) 1.43*** 
Class C 0.26*** (0.01) 1.29*** 0.21*** (0.05) 1.24*** 0.17*** (0.05) 1.18*** 
Class E - - - -0.17 (0.09) 0.85 -0.21*** (0.04) 0.81*** 
Pretrial Detention -0.18*** (0.03) 0.84*** -0.21*** (0.02) 0.81*** -0.24*** (0.02) 0.79*** 
Harlem -0.02* (0.01) 0.98* 0.03*** (0.00) 1.03*** -0.06*** (0.00) 0.95*** 
MTDT-West -0.00 (0.01) 1.00 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 -0.03*** (0.01) 0.97*** 
MTDT-East -0.00 (0.02) 1.00 0.02 (0.01) 1.02 0.04*** (0.01) 1.04*** 
Outside Manhattan -0.35*** (0.06) 0.70*** 0.07*** (0.01) 1.07*** -0.04** (0.01) 0.96** 
Age -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 
Constant 5.22*** (0.11) 185.19*** 5.29*** (0.05) 198.34*** 5.42*** (0.04) 226.32*** 
          
N    3,709    3,105    4,336 





Table 13. Levene’s Tests for Equality of Variance (Time to Disposition Top Coded at 95th 
Percentile) 
 Drug Offenses Person Offenses Property Offenses 
Typescript Status Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N Mean 
Standard 





Countertype 194.80 154.138*** 1,433 204.67 155.42*** 1,551 177.88 
141.56**
* 2,583 
Type 163.67 136.40*** 2,278 172.11 141.06*** 1,554 118.65 
122.32**
* 1,753 
          
N   3,711   3,105   4,336 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Evaluated at the median      
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Table 14. Poisson Regressions for Days to Disposition (Restricted to Cases with Known Defense 
Counsel) 
  Drug Offenses Person Offenses Property Offenses 
VARIABLES 𝜷 Robust SE IRR 𝜷 Robust SE IRR 𝜷 
Robust 
SE IRR 
Type 0.06 (0.07) 1.06 -0.03 (0.02) 0.97 -0.14** (0.05) 0.87** 
Male -0.05 (0.07) 0.95 0.07 (0.08) 1.07 -0.08** (0.03) 0.93** 
Black -0.04 (0.03) 0.96 0.01 (0.05) 1.01 0.15*** (0.03) 1.17*** 
Hispanic 0.02 (0.03) 1.02 0.05 (0.04) 1.05 0.10* (0.05) 1.10* 
Asian -0.20* (0.09) 0.82* 0.08 (0.07) 1.08 0.16** (0.06) 1.17** 
Prior Arrest -0.03 (0.02) 0.97 -0.03 (0.02) 0.97 -0.06 (0.04) 0.94 
Prior Conviction -0.08* (0.04) 0.93* -0.04 (0.03) 0.96 -0.13*** (0.03) 0.88*** 
Public Defender -0.25*** (0.05) 0.78*** -0.17*** (0.03) 0.84*** -0.19*** (0.02) 0.83*** 
Number of Charges 0.06 (0.03) 1.06 0.04 (0.02) 1.04 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 
Number of Counts -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 0.01*** (0.00) 1.01*** 
Class A 0.55*** (0.08) 1.73*** - - - - - - 
Class B 0.29*** (0.04) 1.33*** 0.56*** (0.06) 1.75*** 0.44*** (0.09) 1.55*** 
Class C 0.29*** (0.03) 1.34*** 0.22*** (0.05) 1.25*** 0.19*** (0.04) 1.20*** 
Class E - - - -0.24* (0.10) 0.79* -0.23*** (0.04) 0.79*** 
Pretrial Detention -0.19*** (0.03) 0.83*** -0.25*** (0.03) 0.78*** -0.26*** (0.02) 0.77*** 
Harlem -0.04*** (0.01) 0.96*** 0.04*** (0.00) 1.04*** -0.11*** (0.00) 0.90*** 
MTDT-West -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 0.02 (0.01) 1.02 -0.04*** (0.00) 0.96*** 
MTDT-East 0.02 (0.01) 1.02 0.06*** (0.01) 1.06*** 0.01*** (0.00) 1.01*** 
Outside Manhattan 0.10*** (0.02) 1.10*** 0.09*** (0.01) 1.10*** -0.08*** (0.00) 0.92*** 
Age -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 
Constant 5.36*** (0.15) 212.93*** 5.27*** (0.08) 193.86*** 5.50*** (0.02) 
243.77*
** 
          
N    3,619    2,992    4,190 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05        
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Table 15. Levene’s Tests for Equality of Variance (Restricted to Cases with Known Defense Counsel) 
 Drug Offenses Person Offenses Property Offenses 
Typescript Status Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N 
Countertype 189.87 172.053* 1,341 202.16 164.84* 1,438 179.90 158.97*** 2,437 
Type 167.87 150.78* 2,278 176.11 153.87* 1,554 121.90 134.74*** 1,753 
          
N   3,619   2,992   4,190 




Table 16. Results for the Cumulative Effect of Typescript Characteristics 
 Case Dismissal Charge Reduction Days to Disposition Custodial Sentence 
VARIABLES Logit SE Odds Logit SE Odds 𝜷 SE IRR Logit SE Odds 
Drug Offenses         
 
   
Type -0.28*** (0.06) 0.75*** -0.14 (0.10) 0.87 -0.06 (0.06) .95 0.67*** (0.10) 1.96*** 
Person Offense             
Type -0.06* (0.02) 0.94* 0.02 (0.09) 1.02 -0.10*** (0.02) .91*** 0.94*** (0.09) 2.57*** 
Property Offenses             
Type -0.10 (0.15) 0.91 -0.05 (0.10) 0.95 -0.29*** (0.03) .75*** 1.28*** (0.15) 3.59*** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05        
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Table 17. Support for Hypotheses 








Case Dismissal (-) - (-) -0.15* (-) - 
Charge Reduction (+) - (+) - (+) - 
Days to Disposition (-) - (-) - (-) -0.20** 
Custodial Sentence (-) -0.31* (-) - (-) - 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05     
 
 112 
Table 18. Main Effect of Models Using Alternative Criminal History Measures 
 Case Dismissal Charge Reduction Days to Disposition Custodial Sentence 
VARIABLES Logit SE Logit SE 𝜷 Se Logit SE 
Drug Offenses         
Type -0.06 (0.08) -0.19 (0.31) 0.15* (0.06) -0.31* (0.13) 
Type Only Arrests 0.07 (0.15) -0.17 (0.33) 0.08 (0.10) -0.22 (0.19) 
Type Only Convictions -0.00 (0.16) -0.04 (0.34) 0.22* (0.09) -0.08 (0.15) 
Person Offense         
Type -0.15* (0.07) -0.09 (0.08) 0.04 (0.05) -0.04 (0.16) 
Type Only Arrests -0.04 (0.10) -0.08 (0.09) 0.07 (0.12) -0.26 (0.20) 
Type Only Convictions 0.07 (0.10) 0.20 (0.13) 0.08 (0.07) -0.01 (0.16) 
Property Offenses         
Type -0.13 -0.19 0.05 (0.20) -0.20*** (0.07) 0.04 (0.18) 
Type Only Arrests -0.05 (0.21) 0.17 (0.15) -0.18*** (0.06) -0.12 (0.15) 
Type Only Convictions -0.06 (0.13) 0.14 (0.16) -0.19* (0.08) -0.13 (0.12) 
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